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1 Introduction
1.1 Prologue: The Power of Giving 
In his terse book The Gift: The forms and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies from 1950,
Marcel Mauss argues that the three obligations of gift exchange – to give, receive and reciprocate
– are universal and render such exchange a system of total service (1950: 13). Such systems, at
once economical, religious and moral, give expression to the entirety of social institutions and
thus constitute total social phenomena (Mauss, 1950: 3). Toward the end of unraveling the inner
workings of the total social phenomenon of gift exchange, Mauss asks, “What power resides in
the object given that causes its recipient to pay it back? [italics original]” (ibid: 3). Even though
the  answer  to  this  question,  by  now,  is  somewhat  of  an  anthropological  axiom,  it  is  worth
revisiting since it neatly frames the subject of this paper – the relation between symbolization
and power. This introductory presentation argues that Mauss’s account involves two different
understandings of power, exercised in Polynesian and the Northwest American gift exchange
respectively. In contempt of its subtlety, this distinction opens up an array of questions which
will be addressed in the second part of this paper. One might think of the next page and a half as,
much like a musician, setting the tone.
We  start  by  briefly  considering  the  Northwest  American  institution  of  potlatch,
characteristic of the Tlingit and Haida societies, where the power aspect of gift exchange is most
conspicuous (ibid: 34). The potlatch is a system of gift exchange through which rivaling tribes
contest in status. In short: one tribe invites another to celebrate a certain occasion during which
the  hosting  tribe  expends and destroys  a  significant  amount  of  its  possessions  –  foodstuffs,
valuable copper objects, whale oil,  etc. – towards the end of “‘flatten’ one’s rival”,  who, by
accepting the invitation, is under the obligation to re-invite the host to a subsequent celebration
of its own (ibid: 37). The obligation to accept an invitation and, in turn, invite, is mandatory and
failure to do so has fatal  consequences; “To give is to show one’s superiority [...] To accept
without giving in return, or without giving more back, is to become client and servant.” (ibid:
74).  Thus,  the  act  of  giving  imposes  power  relations  between  agents  as  the  part  unable  to
reciprocate  is  punished  with  slavery  for  debt  (ibid:  42).  Furthermore,  the  paraphernalia  of
potlatch  are,  according to  Mauss,  symbols  of rank;  by demolishing them one exhibits  one’s
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wealth and power. Accordingly, the institution is an example of how symbolic statements and
acts impose power relations between various individuals (ibid: 44).
Whereas Northwest American gift exchange is motivated solely by antagonism – threat
of violence or loss of honor – the motivation for the Polynesian1 variant involves a moral element
(ibid: 7). Discussing the motivation behind the Polynesian gift exchanges, Mauss writes that they
are “acts of politeness […] in which economic transaction is only one element” (ibid: 5) and that
”one gives because one is compelled to do so, because the recipient possesses some kind of right
of  property  over  anything  that  belongs  to  the  donor.  [italics  added]”  (ibid:  13).  The  Maori
tradition  of giving  taonga  (“everything that  can be exchanged” (ibid:  10)) is  adduced as  an
example: when Kiri gives Mere a piece of  taonga, who in turn gives the  taonga to Ngaio in
exchange for another  taonga, Mere is obliged to give that  taonga to Kiri – to reciprocate the
initial  taonga. According to the Maori, it would not be fair of Mere to keep the taonga herself
(ibid: 11). Moreover, Mauss writes that “[t]his […] will give the donors authority and  power
over the first donor, who has become the last percipient. [italics added]”. Now, this is not the
same kind of power as the one exercised in the Northwest American system of gift exchange.
The obligation to return  taonga is due to the fact that it  contains  the spirit of the giver;  the
recipient is obliged to reciprocate by giving back some of his/her spirit  (ibid: 12). Ergo, the
circulation of taonga is partly motivated by religious and moral principles, the maintenance of
which is  a goal  in  itself.  The general  attitude  is,  according to  Mauss,  that  “one clearly and
logically realizes that one must give back to another person what is really part and parcel […] of
his soul.” (ibid: 12). Consequently, the notion of power involved in the Polynesian case is more
subtle  and  opaque  than  the  one  involved  in  the  Northwest  American  case:  it  is  not  power
manifested  in  serfdom.  Even  though  the  institution  of  Polynesian  gift  exchange  is  partly
motivated by status,  prestige and even antagonism, Mauss’s account  suggests that  the moral
nature of gift exchange does  in itself motivate action in a way that seems to be lacking in the
Northwest  American  case.  Yet,  how  should  we  understand  reasons  for  action  seemingly
independent  of  desire?  How are  they  related  to  symbolization?  According to  Abner  Cohen,
answering such questions amounts to an untangling of the central theoretical problem in social
anthropology: the relationship between symbolic action and power relations (1974: 13). One way
1 Henceforth, Polynesian denotes the Samoan and Maori societies discussed in the first chapter of The Gift.
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of approaching Cohen’s problem runs via the seemingly eternal topic of symbolization, to which
we now turn.  
1.2 Background: The Symbolic and Interpretative School 
The 1960s,  together with the first  half  of the 1970s,  was the era of unrest  – both civic and
academic. Whilst the subversive spirit of the counterculture raged on the streets to the tunes of
psychedelia,  a  similar,  albeit  more  sophisticated,  revolution  unfolded  in  the  anthropology
departments. Arguing that culture is irreducible to sheer material circumstances – be they Marx’s
means  of  production  or  Steward’s  ecological  conditions  –  anthropologists  such as  Marshall
Sahlins, Clifford Geertz, Victor Turner and Mary Douglas replaced the enterprise of explaining
social phenomena by subsuming them under general laws, with a semiotic approach revolving
around  understanding cultural meaning by means of interpretation. This method is commonly
known  as  symbolic  and  interpretative  anthropology  and  can  be  viewed  as  a  synthesis  of
hermeneutical  techniques  developed  in  literary  theory  and  modes  of  analysis  inspired  by
structural linguistics. Naturally, symbolic anthropology regards the symbol as indispensable for
penetrating  the  various  idioms  in  which  people  interpret  and  express  culture.  In  this  view,
symbolism, akin to language, is a mode of communication – a shared system of meaning – the
analysis  of which is the very definition of anthropology.  Culture, then, is a mental construct
communicated  symbolically  and  manifested  in  people’s  interpretations  of  events  and  things
surrounding them (McGee, 2012: 438). Notably, within this general framework, quite different
accounts  of  symbolism  have  been  defended.  The  depth  of  symbolic  anthropology  is
demonstrated below by considering Turner and Geertz’s respective theories, which in a sense
mark the onset and conclusion of the paradigm. However, before delving into this more thorough
analysis,  the  width  of  interpretative  and  symbolic  anthropology  is  demonstrated  by  briefly
reviewing  the  works  of  a  few  prominent  contributors  to  the  school,  each  more  or  less
personifying a certain theme.
Over  the  course  of  her  two highly  influential  books,  Purity  and Danger (1966)  and
Natural Symbols (1970), Mary Douglas developed a theory of symbolization according to which
the salience of symbolic and ritual aspects of a social system correlates with the degree of social
pressure  and  coercion  exercised  therein.  A  somewhat  thematic  line  of  reasoning  for
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anthropologists  steeped  in  the  interpretative  and  symbolic  tradition  is  that  the  symbolic
constitutes the very precondition for human cognition and that, consequently,  communication
necessarily  proceeds  through  symbols.  Douglas  voices  this  credo  by  writing  that  symbolic
boundaries are both “necessary […] for the private organizing of experience” (1970:53) and the
gateway to the other’s cosmology (ibid: 154). Douglas’s cardinal concern is with a specific kind
of symbols labeled  natural symbols. In the crudest sense, a symbolic system is natural if it is
anchored in the experience of the physical body (ibid: xxxiii). Departing from the assumption
that the physical body is a potent symbolic locus for the social system, Douglas maintains that
culturally specific conceptions of the body – foremost manifested in dietary and purity rules –
provide a potent channel for understanding how people conceive of the social system in which
they are enmeshed (Douglas 1970:xxxvii). Indeed, in Natural Symbols, Douglas sets out to “[...]
identify four distinctive systems of natural symbols, […] social systems in which the image of
the body is used in different ways to reflect and enhance each person’s experience of society”
(ibid.:  xxxvii).  Natural  symbols,  then,  are  a  concrete  portal  to  an abstract  social  dimension.
Accordingly, interpretation of symbols takes the detour of the empirically conspicuous bodies of
the informants; “the social experience of disorder is expressed by powerfully efficacious symbols
of impurity and danger” (ibid: 90). In the end, Douglas’s theory makes a forceful case for the
merits  of symbolic anthropology as it  reaches outside academia in providing a method – the
condensed version of which urges  us to  “[b]eware […] of arguments  couched in the bodily
medium” (ibid.: 179) – for detecting dogmatic social systems.
Another scholar influenced by the symbolic and interpretative school, and whose work
likewise provides an efficient  social  critique is  Sherry Ortner.  In an attempt  to untangle the
question of how certain symbols manage to sum up a particular culture’s ethos and worldview,
Ortner launches the notion  key symbol. As their name suggests, these are symbols that, once
understood, unlock the cultural logic influencing the actions and thoughts of the informants; they
are prerequisites for investigating the phenomena which they articulate (Lambek, 2008: 157).
Social phenomena, in other words, are most adequately interpreted against the background of
key symbols.  The set of key symbols  divides into two subsets:  summarizing and  elaborative
symbols, respectively "[...] seen as summing up, expressing, representing for the participants in
an  emotionally  powerful  [...]  way,  what  the  system means  for  them",  and  elaborating  upon
complicated feelings and concepts, thus rendering them communicable (ibid: 154). Among the
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features enjoyed by a key symbol counts its tendency to appear in disparate social domains and
the fact that it  is enveloped in explanatory and emotionally charged commentary (ibid: 153).
Like Douglas’s, Ortner’s work amounts to a cogent social critique. In her much acclaimed 1974
article “Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture?”, Ortner straightforwardly spells out why
women universally are perceived as inferior to men. Seeing as the female is a symbol for nature
whilst the male symbolizes culture and that, in turn, things related to nature are subordinated
things related to culture, Ortner infers that the perceived inferiority of women has a symbolic
basis (1974: 71-5). Converted into an action plan, Ortner’s article proposes a possible approach
for dispatching the disabling mindset assuming the subordination of women (ibid: 68). 
Marshall  Sahlins’s seminal  work  Culture and Practical  Reason (1976) concludes this
antecedent  historical  survey.  Even  though  this  particular  book  (which  reads  quite  like  a
manifesto for symbolic anthropology) is quite comprehensive, the leitmotif is the primacy of the
symbolic over the material. In arguing that the symbolic order is the chief determiner of human
action and social development, Sahlins polemicizes with theoreticians such as Karl Marx and
Julian Steward who respectively reduce the symbolic to mere material and ecological conditions.
Contrary to their  views, Sahlins holds that  the material  base of any social  system is  always
filtered through a prior symbolic scheme determining how such a base is perceived and acted
upon. Putting the materialist assumption on its head, the particular means of production exhibited
in a certain society are, according to Sahlins, a function of the symbolic order; “Tallensi farmers
are not related as father and son by the way they enter into production; they enter thus into
production  because they are related as father and son [italics added].” (Sahlins, 1976: 9) Were
this  not  the  case,  cultures  subjected  to  similar  material  circumstances  would  resemble  one
another to a substantially higher degree than they actually do; “it is […] common anthropological
knowledge that the ‘rational’ and ‘objective’ scheme of any given human group is never the only
one  possible”  (ibid:  168).  Thus,  Sahlins  considers  culture  as  an  autonomous  object  of
investigation and, in effect, the discipline of anthropology vital  (ibid: 102). Turning his gaze
homewards,  Sahlins places the West on par with the  Rest in regards to the prominence of a
symbolic mode of thought. Instead of modelling society as a function of monetary transactions
conducted by pragmatically minded agents toward the goal of material fulfillment, one needs to
consider the underlying symbolic structure rendering such activities meaningful in the first place;
“the social meaning of an object that makes it useful to a certain category of persons is no more
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apparent from its physical properties than is the value it may be assigned in exchange” (ibid:
169).  Sahlins  concludes  by  depicting  the  exchange  of  goods  in  capitalist  economies  as  an
instance of symbolic communication through which social categories are reproduced, in the same
stroke granting the term totemic wider application (ibid: 185).
1.3 Objectives 
If the aforementioned discussion shows anything at all, it serves to demonstrate the vastness of
social  phenomena  articulated  through  the  symbol-vocabulary:  cutting  across  the  abstract-
concrete  spectra,  the  symbol  is  simultaneously  the  linchpin  of  human  cognition  and  solid
physical bodies. This fact alone stimulates an investigation into exactly what it is about symbols
that grant them such universal applicability. One possible route of analysis runs into the domain
of anthropological theory construction and the various attempts to pin down the constituents –
sign symbol,  symbolizing,  signifying,  meaning etc. – involved in the notion of symbolization.
Indeed,  this  is  the  route pursued in  the current  paper.2 Initially,  the logical  structure  behind
Geertz  and  Turner’s  respective  notions  of  symbolization  is  made  explicit  by  isolating  the
relevant predicates and their corresponding relata sets. Consecutively, the weaknesses of Geertz
and Turner’s definitions  are  demonstrated  at  some length with the aid of a few well-chosen
critics. Such a demonstration paves the way for the formulation of three criteria of adequacy
which a theory of symbolization need to consider in order not to fall into the same trap as Geertz
and Turner. Bearing these criteria in mind, the paper proceeds by articulating and, subsequently,
specifying Stanley J. Tambiah’s theory of ritual efficacy to the effect of relating the concept of
symbolization to that of deontic power. Upon concluding, an evaluation and possible application
of  Tambiah’s  refined  theory  is  conducted.  Thus,  this  paper  is  disposed  around  the  three
overarching questions:
(1) What composes symbolization according to Geertz and Turner? 
(2) Which are some criteria of adequacy for a theory of symbolization? 
(3) Which features of a theory of symbolization are conducive to satisfying such criteria?
2 In the course of reproducing the various theoreticians’ positions, terms such as concept, notion, predicate and idea
are used interchangeably to denote theoretical entities ranging over empirical data. In section 3.3, the term notion is
used to denote linguistic entities. 
8
Viktor Lundh SANK01
9103043932 HT 2014
Whilst the first two questions are answered in section 2, section 3 answers the third. 
1.4 Scope
In the broadest sense, this paper concerns theories of symbolization (as opposed to symbolism)
revolving around concrete usage; in other words, the relation between symbolic action and its
perceived meaning. Accordingly, the pending analysis leans quite heavily on theoreticians such
as Geertz, Turner and Tambiah, on pain of excluding structuralist accounts in the spirit of Claude
Lévi-Strauss. Justifying this selectivity requires a reproduction of some relevant aspects of Lévi-
Strauss’s anthropology.
Symbolic  order,  according  to  Lévi-Strauss,  exists  independently  of  both  the  things
symbolized and the people who symbolize. Singular instances of symbolization – manifested in
classification schemes, kinship structures, myths etc. – are unconsciously produced symptoms of
the  universal  structure  of  human  cognition  (Lindberg,  2005:  267).  Venturing  beyond  such
ephemeral  symbolic  acts, structuralism purports to explore an allegedly objective and eternal
realm of symbolic meaning. In this view, the meaning of a particular symbol is solely a function
of its relation to other symbols and, ultimately, deducible only from the total sum of symbolic
orders (McGee, 2012: 320-1). In Lévi-Strauss’s words, “Signifying is nothing but establishing a
relation  between  terms.”  (Lambek,  2008:  204).  These  theoretical  assumptions  entail  a
methodology of comparing different complexes of symbols  for the purpose of mapping their
interrelations – their  deep meaning, as it were (Lindberg 2005: 268). Concrete symbolic usage,
then, enjoys a meaning detached from such transient aspects as the intentions of the one doing
the symbolizing and the various interpretations of the act by other agents in the community.
The potential  merits  of  such a  conception  of  symbolic  meaning  may or  may not  be
worthwhile; nevertheless, the stance arguably downplays the actual apprehension of symbolic
meaning by the ones doing the symbolizing; in the end, the key to symbolic meaning exclusively
resides in the anthropologist’s  armchair.  As the subject of this paper centers on the emically
perceived  meaning  of  concrete  symbolic  usage,  structuralist  theories  fall  outside  the  present
scope – their influence on the debate notwithstanding.  
1.5 Terminology
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Before moving on, some notes on terminology revolving around the term intersubjectivity and
the use of variables are presented. The controversy surrounding the notion of intersubjectivity is
mentioned as it figures latently throughout this paper. One rule of sociological method postulated
by Durkheim in his book with the similar title proclaims that “collective thinking in its entirety
[…] must be studied in itself and for itself” (Durkheim, 1982: 42). Upon elaboration, it is stated
that collective thinking, or collective consciousness, “express […] the way in which the group
thinks of itself in its relationships with objects which affect it.” (ibid: 40) Even though such
collective representations manifest  themselves in the behavior of individuals proper, they are
never – due to their all-embracing character – fully realized in any one individual at a specific
moment  in  time  (ibid:  131).  In  line  with  his  realism,  Durkheim’s  discussion  of  collective
consciousness concludes by claiming its irreducibility to individual minds; the collective and the
individual occupy separate spheres of reality and are subjects to different kinds of laws (ibid:
41). 
An opposing view of intersubjectivity is taken by the philosopher John R. Searle, who
uses the term collective intentionality. Firstly, intentionality is defined as “that capacity of the
mind by which it is directed at,  or about, objects and states of affairs in the world, typically
independent of itself.” (Searle, 2012: 25). Put differently: intentionality is the mind’s capacity to
refer to something in a certain psychological mode (e.g. being  afraid of dogs or  loving dogs).
Among the most basic examples is intentionality expressed in first person singular sentences
such as “I intend such-and-such”. Collective intentionality on the other hand, is intentionality
expressed in first person plural form – e.g., “We intend such-and-such” – and is accordingly
analyzed  in  terms  of  individuals  trying  to  achieve  a  common  goal  by  making  separate
contributions;  “In such cases,  I  am doing something  only  as  part  of  our  doing something.”
(Searle, 2006a: 16) Collective intentionality, then, is a state of mind realized in individual agents.
Accordingly, the fundamental difference between Durkheim and Searle’s respective accounts of
intersubjectivity is that the latter does not consider it irreducible; no mysteriously autonomous
social  dimension  is  presupposed  (Searle  2006b:  61).  Overall,  Searle’s  account  enjoys  a
considerably  higher  degree  of  stringency  than  Durkheim’s.  For  those  reasons,  the  term
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intersubjectivity is, at least in the concluding part of the current paper (section 3.3), treated as
synonymous with collective intentionality.3 
As regards to the recurrent use of variables, some aspects deserves to be mentioned for
the  sake  of  clarity.  First  off,  every  variable  used  is  explicitly  defined  upon  introduction.
Generally,  the symbols  –  A,  X,  Y,  C,  P,  a,  x,  y,  p –  used for  representing variables  denote
different sets of entities or individual members of such sets throughout the paper; they are simply
a  means  for  delineating  the  logical  or  syntactical  structure  of  certain  notions  and do not  in
themselves carry semantic baggage. The significata of the variables are indicated by expressions
such as “let X denote such-and-such” or “The X-term is satisfied by such-and-such”. Moreover,
upper-case variables  denote abstract  properties  or sets  of things whilst  a  lower-case variable
denotes a concrete entity or a member of a set. In the latter case, the “same” lower-case letter
(e.g.,  x)  is  used  when  a  concrete  entity  is  a  member  of  an  abstract  set  denoted  by  the
corresponding upper-case letter (e.g.,  X). Lastly,  note that expressions such as “p-symbol”, “p-
symbolic” and “p-symbolization”,  occurring in section 3.3, do not involve variables.  As will
become apparent, the p’s figuring in these expressions indicate that the notion of symbolization
in  question  is  but  one possible  notion  of  symbolization(s),  as  opposed  to  symbolization  in
general.        
3 Since a full discussion of the similarities between Searle and Durkheim’s respective social ontologies is outside
the scope of the current paper, the interested reader is directed to Searle’s article “Searle versus Durkheim and the
waves of thought: Reply to Gross” (2006b) for a further discussion on this topic.
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2 General Theories of Symbolization
2.1 Clifford Geertz and the Untiring Symbolizer  
Geertz conceives of cultures as texts and thence objects for interpretation. What is interpreted is
symbolic behavior;  culture unfolds as a narrative driven by a series of symbolic actions and
statements open for interpretation by both informant  and anthropologist.  Geertz,  therefore,  is
involved  in  a  double hermeneutic  in  which  the  anthropologist  interprets  his/her  informants’
interpretations  of  their  own  culture  (McGee,  2012:  438).  The  justification  for  this
characterization of culture is twofold: Geertz both argues that its philosophical underpinning is
sound, and that it makes for a beneficial analytical tool.
The  notion  of  the  symbol  is  the  mainstay  in  Geertz’s  theoretical  edifice  The
Interpretation  of  Cultures  from 1973.  During  the  course  of  this  book,  most  of  the  generic
anthropological analysanda are one after the other traced back to one mutual root: the symbol.
Most  importantly,  the  notion  figures  in  the  definition  of  culture,  whose  definiens  can  be
summarized as “[an] interworked system of construable signs [...] something to which social
events,  behaviors,  institutions,  or  processes  can  be  causally attributed"  (Geertz,  1973:  14).4
Besides culture, the list of anthropological concepts reduced to symbols contains ideology (ibid:
220) and religion (ibid: 90). Furthermore, statements such as "[i]t is [...] not truth that varies with
social,  psychological,  and  cultural  contexts  but  the  symbols  we  construct  in  our  unequally
effective attempts to grasp it" (ibid: 212) are symptomatic for the prominent role given to the
notion of the symbol by Geertz.
4 Traditionally,  authors  writing  from the  interpretative  and  symbolic  perspective  distinguish  between  sign and
symbol. The former is usually conceived of as an entity  indicating a certain state of affairs, whereas the latter is
generally thought of as an entity representing another entity in the abstract. For instance, the sound of rain is a sign
indicating that it is raining, whilst a proper name symbolizes its bearer, irrespective of prevailing states of affairs
(Langer, 1951: 57-9). However, Geertz does not address this distinction apart from writing that, “[...] construable
signs (what, ignoring provincial usages, I would call symbols)” (1973: 14). The present paper will only consider
symbols in the aforementioned conception.
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A closer  reading  of  the  article  “Religion  as  a  Cultural  System” reveals  how Geertz
understands symbolism in  the broadest  sense.  Here,  the author  gives  the  following informal
explanation of a symbol: "any object, act, event, quality, or relation which serves as a vehicle for
a conception – the conception is the symbol's 'meaning'". He then continues by adducing the
number six, the Guernica and the morpheme “-ing” as examples of symbols (ibid: 91). 
Throughout his discussion on symbolism, Geertz refers extensively to the philosopher
Susanne K. Langer, particularly her book  Philosophy in a New Key,  which presents a logical
analysis of symbolization. Langer holds that symbols are vehicles for the conception of objects
and that they,  accordingly,  get  their  meaning from associative  relations  to the conception in
question (Langer, 1951: 61). Langer’s full unpacking of the formula “X symbolizes Y” – where
the  X-term denotes  the  set  of  symbols  and  the  Y-term denotes  a  concept  or  conceptions  –
culminates  in the paraphrase “the symbol  is related,  for a specific  agent,  with a connotation
through which the agent  conceives  the object”  (Langer,  1951: 64).  Whilst  symbolization (or
denotation, in Langer’s vocabulary) is a strictly logical operation exploiting the semantic relation
between  symbol  and  concept  (i.e.  the  sum  of  all  individual  conceptions),  connotation  is
psychological and arbitrary; it regards the ideas associated with the subjective conception of an
objective object. For instance, when we use the symbol “James” to symbolize a certain person
and mistakenly suppose that it connotes a man with such-and-such characteristics “we are not
mistaking James for someone else, but we are  mistaken about James.” (ibid: 65)5 Langer also
ascribes the symbol an essential explanatory role in defining ritual as the active termination of a
symbolic transformation of experience born of an elementary need to manipulate symbols (ibid:
45). Both Langer and Geertz thus hold that the referent of the symbol is a conception of an
entity. 
Drawing on the philosopher Gilbert Ryle’s theory of the mind, Geertz deems the symbol
integral for understanding human nature. Mind, according to Geertz, is "a term denoting a class
of skills,  propensities, capacities, tendencies, habits";  in other words, an organized system of
dispositions that manifests itself in actions and objects (1973: 58). In this view, the mind is –
contrary to the behaviorists  – irreducible  to sheer  behavior  as it  instead consists  of a  set  of
5 This is a simplistic reproduction of Langer’s quite comprising theory of symbols. Since Geertz’s is content with
holding that conceptions are the referent of symbols, Langer’s full account would confuse more than enlighten.
Therefore, interested readers are referred to chapter three of Langer’s book (1951).
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dispositions to act, think and feel that, in turn, are deducible from observable behavior (Geertz,
1973:  59).  Importantly,  the  set  of  dispositions  composing  the  mind  involves  tendencies  to
manipulate symbols in such a way that situations are made intelligible,  a property by Geertz
regarded as necessary for human cognition. This account echoes Langer’s, whose definition of
mind  likewise  involves  a  disposition  to  interpret  symbols.  Nevertheless,  Langer  carries  the
analysis to its logical peak by holding that the current of passing experience is transformed into
symbols  which  we  think  with;  experience  “is  sucked  into  the  stream  of  symbols  which
constitutes a  human mind [italics  added]."  (1951:  42)  This  feature  renders  human  cognition
intersubjective,  rather  than  subjective,  in  placing  the  symbols  by  means  of  which  the  mind
operates in an intersubjective sphere.
Another quite thematic line of reasoning, unfolding piecemeal over several articles, states
that the symbol is a precondition for human cognition, emotion and intersubjectivity (Geertz,
1973: 49, 141). The basic idea is that "[t]hinking consists  [...]  of a traffic in [...]  significant
symbols", including everything from words and pictures to physical objects. One must employ
and interpret  symbols  in  order  to  coherently  structure  the  events  of  everyday  life;  to  orient
oneself  within  “‘the  ongoing  course  of  experienced  things.’”  (ibid:  45)  Such  orientation
encompasses the emotional aspects of events as well: just as a road map might be used to make
the way from one destination to another, a novel by Franz Kafka might enable one to form a
certain attitude toward bureaucracy (ibid.: 81). 
It should also be noted that the Geertzian symbol functions as a model for and a model of
some domain of reality simultaneously. If x is a symbol and y is some concrete domain of reality,
then x relates to y in two ways:
x functions as a model of y if x renders y intelligible through representation and x functions as a
model for y if x is used in the construction of y.
Even though the relation between the two functions is never explicitly addressed, Geertz’s argues
that it is this double function that most conspicuously sets the symbol apart from related notions
(ibid: 93). However, we previously noted that the meaning of a symbol is a conception of the
entity  which  the  symbol  in  question  purports  to  signify.  Seemingly,  the  entity  predates  any
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conception of the entity;  therefore, it  is uncertain whether the non-symbolic entity which the
symbol is a model for is part of the symbol’s meaning.
By now,  we can  conclude  that  Geertz’s  notion  of  the  symbol is  an  unary  predicate
satisfied  by all  and only those entities  serving as a  precondition  for cognition,  emotion  and
intersubjectivity by imposing order on experience and function both as a model for and model of
a non-symbolic domain of reality. Consequently, the logical structure of symbolization takes the
general form:
X symbolizes Y
Where  X is the set of all symbols and  Y is the set of subjective conceptions of an objectively
available entity – the intersubjective meaning of the symbol, as it were. Furthermore, the relation
symbolizes is, in Langer’s sense, a semantic convention. 
Equipped with a more exact rendition of symbolization, Geertz proceeds by allying the
notion with neighboring concepts. For example, the notion is linked to cultural action, which is
"the  construction,  apprehension  and  utilization  of  symbolic  form",  through the  fact  that  the
symbolic is an abstraction from such action; cultural action is a guide to the various conceptions
composing  the  symbol’s  significata  (ibid:  91).  Moreover,  symbols  are  extrinsic  sources  of
information,  meaning that  they populate  an intersubjective  sphere against  the background of
which public behavior takes shape – hence the empirical availability of symbols (ibid: 92). It is
also suggested that the symbol acquires empirical content through cultural action; "[w]hatever, or
wherever, symbol systems ‘in their own terms’ may be, we gain empirical access to them by
inspecting events" (ibid: 17).
It  is  the  empirical  availability  of  the  symbol  that  permits  Geertz’s  famous  thick
description,  which  first  appears  in  the  article  “Thick  Description:  Toward  an  Interpretative
Theory of Culture”.  By outlining the contours of this  narrative device,  an elucidation of the
relation  between  symbolization  and  context  is  achieved.  An  initial  formulation  of  the  thick
description is accomplished by means of contrast:  A wink can be described in physiological
terms, cultural terms or both. A thin description purely reports the physiological aspect whilst a
thick description views the wink as a symbol and renders it intelligible by interpreting it against
the background of the cultural  context  in question (ibid:  6).  A thick description is  always  a
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second order interpretation of the alleged symbolic system within which the informant operates.
According to the methodological implications of such a double hermeneutic "we begin with our
own  interpretations  of  what  our  informants  are  up  to,  or  think  they  are  up  to,  and  then
systematize those" (ibid: 15). Even though the thick description, to a certain degree is fictional,
Geertz  reckons  it  conducive  for  an  anthropological  strive  for  objectivity.  Moreover,  a  thick
description should be judged by its ability to channel a new perspective to the reader – "to bring
us into touch with the lives of strangers" (ibid: 17). Another condition imposed by Geertz on the
thick description is that it must discriminate what is  said in the cultural action (ibid: 20). The
said denotes the symbolic structures against the background of which cultural action is enacted
and  interpreted.  Thus  the  anthropologist’s  "task  is  to  uncover  the  conceptual  structures  that
inform our  subjects'  acts,  the  'said'  of  social  discourse  [...]"  (ibid:  27).6 It  can  therefore  be
concluded that the thick description is the anthropologist’s fictional interpretation of the idioms
in which the informants understand their lives, alternatively, of which relations hold between the
alleged  symbolic  system in  question  and  the  cultural  actions  which  it  informs.  The  logical
structure of symbolization – “X  symbolizes Y” – must then be extended to include the wider
symbolic system, subsequently taking the form:
X symbolizes Y in context C7
If one were to summarize the main tenets of Geertz’s theory, one could start by saying that the
vocabulary of technical terms stemming from the notion of the symbol (e.g.,  religion,  ritual,
ideology  and  culture)  finds  a  concrete  expression  through  tangible  cultural  actions  and
statements which, accordingly, are described in observational terms. This, in turn, is possible in
the  light  of  an  extrinsic  theory  of  cognition  stating  that  thinking  is  performed  through
intersubjective  objects:  "[t]hinking,  conceptualization,  formulation,  comprehension,
understanding,  or  what-have-you,  consists  [...]  of  a  matching  of  the  states  and processes  of
6 Raymond Firth makes a similar point in writing that “the anthropological approach […] has as objective to provide
a systematic description and analysis of [...] a symbolic act in its verbal and non-verbal aspects; to distinguish those
parts of the action held to be significant from those which are incidental.” (1975: 27)
7 Henceforth,  this  formula  is  simply  denoted  the  general  formula.  Note  that  this  formula  is  given  different
interpretations by different theoreticians. As we shall see, the set of entities satisfying the  X-term is in Turner’s
theory a subset of the set adduced by Geertz.    
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symbolic models against the states and processes of the wider world" (ibid: 214). Then, there is
the  thick  description  utilizing  the  intersubjectivity  that  occurs  when  the  concrete  world  of
meaningful  actions  produced  by  emic  symbolic  interpretation  (satisfying  the  Y-term  in  the
general formula) meets the abstract world of symbols (satisfying the X-term); it grants the reader
access to the other’s point of view by unveiling the logic behind the symbolic system (denoted
by the C-term) in which the informants operate by correlating symbolic structures with actions.
Finally,  the whole enterprise is anchored in the definition of  mind as a set of dispositions to
manipulate intersubjective symbols. It is thus clear that one aspect of symbolic meaning is the
action produced by the employment of symbols – a theme which is revisited in the second half of
this paper.
***
In order to fully evaluate (see section 2.3) Geertz’s theory of symbolization, a reproduction of his
analysis  of  the  Balinese  cockfight  is  necessary.  Geertz  demonstrates  the  relation  between
symbolic structure and cultural action by analyzing the Balinese cockfight as a piece of cultural
text unfolding by continuous symbolic enactment. The cultural context in which Geertz develops
his famous interpretation of the Balinese cockfight – the village of Tihingan, in the Kungklung
region of southeast Bali – is heavily impregnated with cock-symbolism. Since the associative
relation between the cock and masculinity is the same in Bali as in English speaking countries,
the  cock  is  a  potent  channel  for  understanding  Balinese  attitudes  toward  status  and  power
(Geertz, 1973: 447). 
Statements referring to roosters are symbolic: the word  cock itself – depending on the
context – denotes a hero, a warrior, a champion, as well as a lady killer or a tough guy. The
average Balinese man spends the majority of his time grooming and discussing his rooster; for
instance,  sitting with the rooster  between his legs and bouncing it  up and down in order to
strengthen it,  or  pushing it  toward  a  neighbor's  rooster  to  inflame its  fighting  spirit  only to
calmingly withdraw it the next moment (ibid: 419). The cardinal signifiers of the cock are the
magnification of the owner’s masculine self and his inner animality, or darkness. Quite naturally,
the cockfight  is  a forum for  both ventilating  potential  animalistic  desires  and proving one’s
masculinity (ibid: 420). Even though such conclusions suggest a functionalist  analysis  of the
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cockfight,  the  fact  that  these  fights  are  autonomous  events  –  the  gaining  or  loss  of  status
occurring therein have no bearing outside the arena – points to an alternative interpretation of the
phenomena. Through the concept of deep game, Geertz argues that the cockfight is an expression
of the Balinese culture at large and that each fight is a concrete manifestation of the various
hierarchies permeating the Balinese social system. Indeed, such an analysis is emblematic for
anthropologist’s  writing  from a  symbolic  and  interpretative  perspective  according  to  which
culture is embedded in people’s own interpretations of events and things around them. Thus, the
cockfighters and audience members are both enacting certain structural features of their social
system veiled by everyday life and interpreting them simultaneously (ibid: 449). However, for
present purposes, it is Geertz’s argument, rather than his conclusions, that are of relevance.
Geertz  adduces  a  distinction  between  deep  and  shallow  play  in  order  to  demarcate
cockfights  of  symbolic  character  –  as  described  above  –  from  merely  practical  ones.  The
distinction is defined with reference to the dual betting system: The types of bets performed in a
cockfight are either center or peripheral. Center bets are large and collective bets between the
owners of the fighting cocks and their respective kinsmen, whereas peripheral bets are small and
individual bets between the members of the audience. Moreover, the center bet is organized and
handled  by the  umpire  whilst  the  peripheral  bets  are  impulsive  and somewhat  happenstance
(ibid: 425). The higher the center bet is, the higher and more even the peripheral bets are. This is
due to the fact that a high center bet indicates a close matchup and even odds – a deep play (ibid:
430). Now, why would even odds, counter to rational thinking, raise the bets? Geertz explanation
is that monetary risk-taking is a symbol of moral import rather than utility and playing deep is a
way of gaining status; “[i]t is in large part because the marginal disutility of loss is so great at the
higher levels of betting that to engage in such betting is to lay one's public self, allusively and
metaphorically, through the medium of one's cock, on the line.” (ibid: 434) By this device, the
actions and utterances – the betting – occurring in deep plays are interpreted as symbolic. The
actions and utterances involved in shallow play, characterized by uneven odds and lower bets
are,  on  the  contrary,  interpreted  as  practical;  “[i]t  is,  in  fact,  in  shallow  games  [...]  that
increments and decrements of cash are more nearly synonyms for utility and disutility,  in the
ordinary,  unexpanded  sense  for  pleasure  and  pain,  happiness  and  unhappiness.”  (ibid:  433)
Furthermore, the shallow play attracts the pathological gambler pawning his/her belongings in
wish to break even (ibid: 434). In short: ceteris paribus, the more even the odds are, the higher
18
Viktor Lundh SANK01
9103043932 HT 2014
the bets and deeper the play is; the deeper the play is, the more symbolically charged the actions
and utterances are.
2.1.1 Critique: deduction of the distinguishability and evaluation criteria
I.  C. Jarvie’s article  “On the Limits  of Symbolic  Interpretation in  Anthropology” contains  a
number of arguments aimed at bringing the symbolic and interpretative school in anthropology
to more realistic altitudes. The author claims that his critique besets the entire paradigm as it
primarily targets statements such as  “the ritual action […] serve to ‘say something’ about the
social situation and the social condition of the parties involved, they do not express the sum of
Aboriginal  knowledge”  (Leach,  1966:  41)  and  “[...]  the  cockfight  is  –  or  more  exactly,
deliberately is made to be – a simulation of the social matrix […] in which its devotees live.”
(Geertz,  1973:  436)  According  to  Jarvie,  such  “something’s”  and  simulations  are  the
anthropologist’s  own imaginative  constructions  unfruitfully  muddling  the  actual  meaning  of
informants’ utterances.
The  underlying  problematic  of  symbolic  anthropology  –  whose  cardinal  assumption
according to Jarvie is taken to be the belief that “all human actions have a significance beyond
any stated or manifest purpose, [...] they symbolize [...] something.” – is its inherent distinction
between  practical and  symbolic statements. The first term denotes statements referring to the
concrete, ostensibly available surrounding whilst the second term denotes statements referring to
metaphysical ideas or social relationships (Jarvie, 1976: 687). For the present purposes, the most
important criticism that Jarvie brings forth is the arbitrariness involved in separating the first
kind  of  statement  from  the  second.  Firstly,  the  mechanism  behind  discriminating  between
practical and symbolic statements seems to be subjective as every statement, in order for its truth
value to be assessed, initially must be treated as practical and only afterwards, depending on the
results  of  the  evaluation,  be  rejected  as  symbolic.  Secondly,  even  if  there  was  such  a
demarcation, there would be no objective method of interpretation to aid the understanding of the
symbolic patterns (ibid: 689). In Edmund Leach’s own words: “How do I know such patterns are
significant? I don’t. I find them interesting [italics added]” (1966: 45).
One does not have to delve further into this  polemic in order to see that  the general
problem is one of interpretation,  namely:  which statements are symbolical and which are the
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criteria for interpreting such statements?8 Thus, Jarvie’s article points to the indeterminacy of
interpretation  and  can  be  read  as  a  guide  for  formulating  criteria  for  objectively  assessing
whether a statement or act is symbolic or practical, and which of contesting interpretations of a
given symbolic statement or act is more probable. Therefore, it is arguable that every theory of
symbolization need include at least one un-arbitrary mechanism for (1) determining whether a
statement or act is symbolic or practical and (2) evaluating contesting interpretations of symbolic
statements or acts. The first is the criterion of distinguishability and the second is the criterion of
evaluation. The criterion of evaluation does imply that there is but one absolute interpretation of
a given instance of a symbolic statement or act, namely the function it has for the informants
involved. However, various instances of superficially the same symbolic statement or act allow
different interpretations under different circumstances. It should be noted that a theory satisfying
the criterion of evaluation is of limited value if it  simultaneously disrespects the criterion of
distinguishability.  Similar  meta-discussions  have  been  conducted  by  rather  esteemed
anthropologists. For example, Firth deduces a set of criteria for the proper employment of terms
such as  sign,  icon and  symbol.  In  short,  Firth  advices  anthropologists  to  ask themselves  the
question; “What phenomena are classed as symbolic and what criteria are used for identifying
them?” (1975: 37).9 
Given the inclusive scope of Geertz notion of the symbol, it is prima facie plausible that
his  analysis  lacks  proper  mechanisms  for  distinguishing  between  practical  and  symbolic
statements, let alone mechanism for evaluating competing interpretations of symbolic statements.
Moreover, it is uncertain whether Geertz, defining symbols as vehicles of thought and a fortiori
every statement as symbolic, even agrees with such a distinction in the first place. However,
some  examples  given in  the  aforementioned  analysis  of  the  Balinese  cockfight  suggest  that
8 Even though Jarvie limits his discussion to symbolic statements, I also include symbolic acts in the following 
analysis. The definition of “p-symbolic act” will be given in section 3.3.      
9 Firth’s own contention is that symbolization, in the most general sense, consists of a symbol with a complex series
of associations describable in terms of partial representation (Firth, 1975: 75). Although such representation gives an
arbitrary  impression,  a  more  precise  set  of  significata  discloses  itself  as  the  anthropologist  ventures  into  the
operational function of symbols in a certain context (ibid: 76). A possible mechanism for distinguishing between
practical and symbolic statements is – for the sake of example – thus constructible with reference to the different
kinds of uses of such statements.
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Geertz at least distinguished between degrees of symbolic content: Firstly, there are descriptions
of informants’ behavior that would come across as rather awkward if taken as symbolic. For
example, the practice of strengthening and inducing a fighting spirit in one’s rooster by pushing
it toward a neighbor's rooster would – given that the rooster symbolizes the owner’s masculinity
– mean that the owner actually pushes  himself toward the neighbor, in an act of inflaming his
own fighting spirit,  something which is  quite  unlikely given Geertz’s  characterization of the
generic Balinese (outside the context of the cockfight) as extremely afraid of conflicts (Geertz,
1973: 446). Secondly, the statement that the deeper the play is, the more symbolically charged,
suggests that statements and actions enjoy degrees of symbolic content. On Geertz account, the
mechanism for establishing such a degree seems, at least partially, to be defined in terms of risk-
taking. A high bet is to a higher degree symbolic than a low bet whereas some bets (e.g. those
forwarded by gambling addicts in shallow play) lack symbolic content entirely and are explicitly
interpreted as practical actions. Nonetheless, such a mechanism is arbitrary at best since it does
not consider the relative aspect of destitution. According to Geertz’s reasoning, the gambling
addict pawning his belongings in order to bet in shallow plays is acting more symbolically than
an  affluent  person  betting  in  deep  plays  since  the  he/she  takes  the  higher  risk.  A  possible
objection to the present interpretation of Geertz’s analysis is that it ignores the other criteria for
determining  the  statement’s  degree  of  symbolic  content.  For  instance,  Geertz  writes  that  a
cockfight between high status individuals is more symbolically charged than a fight between low
status  individuals;  the  low  status  of  the  participants  in  shallow  play  renders  the  fight  less
symbolically charged (ibid: 441). Unfortunately, status is defined in terms of risk-taking, which –
as  noted  above  –  is  relative.  This  being  said,  the  idea  of  letting  the  context  define  the
mechanisms for distinguishing between practical and symbolic statements and actions might turn
out fruitful – as will be demonstrated below.
2.2 Victor Turner and the Untiring Interpreter  
Turner, belonging to the generation of anthropologists prior to Geertz, represents a somewhat
different approach – theoretical as well as methodological. While Geertz gives transcendental
arguments  for  the  prominence  of  symbols,  Turner,  grounding  his  discussion  in  extensive
ethnographic  data,  justifies  his  theory  of  symbolism  in  structural  functionalist  terms  as  an
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explanation  for  social  dynamism (McGee,  2012:  439).  Another  difference  between  the  two
writers is that Turner’s account unfolds  a posteriori as the anthropologist ventures deeper into
the Zambian forest, while Geertz, to greater extent, develops his a priori; the arguments are not
couched in empirical data.
Quoting the Concise Oxford Dictionary, Turner begins the article “Symbols in Ndembu
Culture” from 1958, by defining  symbol as “a thing regarded by general consent as naturally
typifying  or  representing  or  recalling  something  by possession  of  analogous  qualities  or  by
association in fact or thought.” Most of the article is dedicated to the explication of this, rather
vague, definition against the background of actual Ndembu symbol use.10 Turner’s gateway into
Ndembu symbolization is the ritual: the symbol is “the smallest unit of ritual which still retains
the specific properties of ritual behavior […] The ultimate unit of specific properties of specific
structure in a ritual context” (Turner, 1967: 19). Furthermore, the symbol aids the understanding
of social action as “[e]ach kind of ritual is a patterned process in time, the units of which are […]
items  of  symbolic behaviour.”  (ibid:  45)  Among  the  many  informal  examples  given  of  the
symbol  counts  objects,  activities,  relationships,  events,  gestures  and spatial  units  in  a  ritual
context (ibid: 19). It can thus be concluded that Turner, in concert with Geertz, proposes the
triadic structure of symbolization: X symbolizes Y in context C.
The X-term in Turner’s vocabulary denotes the set of  dominant, or ritual symbols, a set
of symbols producing actions and overall behavior in a ritual context as well as representing
axiomatic  values  regarded as  ends  in  themselves  (ibid:  20).  Formally,  the  dominant  symbol
necessarily has three properties: (1) condensation, meaning that “[m]any things and actions are
represented in a single formation”, (2) unification, referring to the fact that a dominant symbol
illuminates  the  interconnectedness  of  seemingly  disparate  significata  and  (3)  polarization,
according to which a dominant symbol has two poles of meaning; the ideological pole, referring
to  “components  of  the  moral  and  social  orders”  and  the  sensory  pole,  in  turn,  designating
“natural and physiological phenomena” – the symbol’s external representation (ibid: 28). As an
example of a dominant symbol Turner gives the milk tree in the context of the  Nkang’a  (the
10 Turner  spent  a  career  in  the  Zambian  forest  living among the Ndembu,  a  collection  of  tribes  of  particular
anthropological  interest  as  the  symbolic  and  ritualistic  elements  are  quite  ubiquitous  in  Ndembu  culture.  The
interested reader finds an outline of the Ndembu lifestyle in the introduction to Turner’s 1967 book The Forest of
Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual. 
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girls’  puberty ritual).  The milk tree has the property of condensation since it  admits  several
meanings. Over the course of five pages, the milk tree’s flora of significata is arduously spelled
out,  which –  inter alia – includes: human breast  milk,  breasts simpliciter,  the bond between
mother  and  child,  matriliny,  the  unity  and  continuation  of  Ndembu  society,  knowledge
(according to one informant the novice “drinks sense as a baby drinks milk” (ibid: 53) – much in
the same manner as westerners might “thirst for knowledge”), social differentiation, women as a
social  category,  the  solidarity  of  women,  group  harmony,  the  coming-of-age  of  the  novice
herself, the conflict between girlhood and adulthood, the opposition between the novice’s mother
and other tribeswomen, and lastly, virilocal marriage (ibid: 20-5). As this list demonstrates, the
milk tree has the properties of unification and polarization. Firstly,  the milk tree unifies such
different  ideas  as  breast  milk  and  social  differentiation.  Secondly,  the  milk  tree  has  an
ideological pole – consisting of referents such as women as a social group and the continuation
of Ndembu society – as well as a sensory pole – consisting in significata on the theme of breasts.
Moreover, the milk tree produces action as women dance around it and mobilize in opposition to
men (e.g., women sing about how men are not allowed near the milk tree during N’kanga).11
A lot has been said about the meaning of a dominant symbol (the Y-term in the general
formula)  in  the  aforementioned  discussion  without  much  precision.  In  the  article  “Ritual
Symbolism, Morality, and Social Structure among the Ndembu” from 1963, the meaning aspect
of symbolization takes center stage. A dominant symbol has three fields of meaning: exegetical
meaning,  operational meaning and  positional meaning.  The exegetical  meaning is  “obtained
from  questioning  indigenous  informants  about  observed  ritual  behaviour.”  (ibid:  50)  In
conversation  with  his  Ndembu informants  (mostly  the  key informant  and friend,  Muchona),
Turner  notices  that  their  interpretations  revolve  around  two  aspects:  the  etymology  of  the
symbol’s name and the physical properties of the symbol. For instance, according to Turner’s
informants, the musengh’u tree derives its name from ku-seng’uka, “to multiply” because the tree
bears  a  great  number  of  tiny  black  edible  fruits.  In  gynecological  rituals  it  represents  “a
11 It  should be noted that Turner contrasts the dominant symbol with the  instrumental  symbol. The latter term
denotes the set of symbols regarded as means for attaining the overall goals of the rituals in which they figure. For
instance, parts of fruit-bearing trees are used in women’s fertility rituals since, according to the Ndembu, the fruits
represent children (Turner, 1967: 32). There are two reasons for excluding the instrumental symbol from further
analysis: apart from the above, not much is said about it, and its relation to the dominant symbol is unclear.
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multiplicity of offspring” and in hunting rituals it represents “a multiplicity of killings” (ibid:
289).  Equating,  on the other  hand,  the symbol’s  meaning with its  actual  use amounts  to  its
operational  meaning.  Hence,  the  facts  that,  during  Nkang’a,  only  the  senior  women  of  the
novices’ village are allowed to dance around the milk tree in the early morning and that they
mock the novices’ mothers when they try to join, points to social disharmony (ibid: 56). Lastly,
and  drawing  on  structural  linguistics,  positional meaning  is  a  function  of  the  relationship
between the symbol in question and the total symbolic structure in which it is enmeshed (ibid:
51). The positional meaning of the milk tree, Turner laconically exemplifies, is a product of its
association with symbols of suffering and dying (ibid: 52). It should be noted that positional
meaning is an abstraction from the exegetical and operational meanings and thus not directly
available to the anthropologist. This tripartite definition of symbolic meaning has the merit of
explaining how the semantic structure of a dominant symbol develops from the concrete to the
abstract – in the case of the milk tree: from the breast, via the mother-child bond, to the Ndembu
society at large (ibid: 54).
Turner’s focus on ritual displays the relevance of context (denoted by the C-term in the
general formula) in general and the role of symbolic action in particular. Of the two main types
of context posited by Turner:  action-field  context,  which ranges from a series of rituals  to a
single  ritual,  and  the  wider  cultural context  “in  which  symbols  are  regarded  as  clusters  of
abstract  meanings”,  it  is  the  action-field  context  that  renders  symbols  empirically  available
through  cultural  action  (ibid:  43).  Preceding  Geertz,  Turner  writes  that  “[s]ymbols  instigate
social  action.  In  a  field  context  they  may  even  be  described  as  ‘forces,’  in  that  they  are
determinable influences inclining persons and groups to action.” (ibid: 36). An action-field, then,
is a structure of relations abstracted from the data obtained about the symbol's operational and
exegetical meanings (ibid: 116). The cultural context, on the other hand, is worked out by the
anthropologist  and mainly regards  the symbol’s  positional  meaning.  It  is  often the case that
dominant symbols take on more abstract meanings in a cultural context – as noted above, Turner
hypothesizes that the milk tree represents societal continuity. The analysis of symbolic meaning
then starts  off  by considering the widest  action-field context,  namely the series of rituals  in
which the ritual containing the symbol under scrutiny is a phase (e.g., a rite de passage). At this
level,  the  circumstances  –  natural  phenomena,  life-crisis,  social  crisis  –  which  the  ritual
addresses and which partly determines the meaning of the symbol, are salient (e.g., in  rite de
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passage, the circumstance concerned is life-crisis). The next step of analysis narrows the action-
field  by  focusing  on  the  specific  ritual  in  which  the  symbol  is  used,  where  the  symbol’s
exegetical  and  operational  meanings  are  inferred  (ibid:  45).  Moreover,  the  same  dominant
symbol can take on different, even contradictory, meanings in different action-field contexts. The
color red, for example, represents both illness and health depending on the action-field (ibid: 70).
The  aforementioned  reproduction  demonstrates  that  Turner,  in  line  with  Geertz,  deems  the
logical structure of symbolization to take the form “X  symbolizes Y  in context C”  where the
relation symbolizes is an act wherein a dominant symbol (the set of which satisfies the X-term) is
manipulated in an action-field context (denoted by the  C-term) to the effect of altering some
aspect of the social system; for instance, individual status ascription or change in social relations
between agents. The relation in is important since dominant symbols are only meaningful as long
as they are ritually enacted. The nature of the alternation in status brought about by symbolic
usage is determined by the meaning (referred to by the Y-term) imposed on the dominant symbol.
Accordingly, the behavior produced by the manipulation of dominant symbols in an action-field
context is a function of its interpretation by the agents – its exegetical and operational meaning.
The  anthropologist’s  task  is  then  to,  by  means  of  observation  and  interrogation,  map  the
operational and exegetical meanings and, by means of comparison, positional meaning of the
dominant symbol.
2.2.1 Critique: deduction of the closure criterion
As  has  been  demonstrated  above,  Turner  alludes  extensively  to  the  notion  of  meaning in
delineating the extension of the Y-term in his interpretation of the general formula. In postulating
a three level analysis of symbolic meaning, Turner places numerous – according to Dan Sperber,
even “all  the conceivable” – properties of the symbol under the vastly inclusive category of
meaning.  Sperber  presents an efficient  critique of Turner’s  lax usage of “meaning”  (Sperber
1975: 13).
Sperber labels the kind of entity which has meaning a code. A code is defined as a set of
pairs  consisting  in  a  message and  an  interpretation (henceforth  denoted:  “{message,
interpretation}”).  The meaning of the message is decoded by the interpretation through some
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univocal and generalizable mechanism (ibid: 14).12 The symbol is an instance of the message, but
what kinds of things constitute interpretations? One possibility is the one forwarded by Turner,
who postulates the three pairs: symbol and exegesis (exegetical meaning),  symbol and usage
(operational  meaning)  and symbol  and other symbols  (positional  meaning).  As demonstrated
above, the positional meaning is an abstraction from the exegetical and operational meaning. The
exegetical and operational meanings, in turn, are according to Sperber not instances of meaning-
relations at  all since the exegesis and usage paired with the symbol do not, contrary to their
pretense,  constitute its interpretations.  Instead, exegesis and usage are simply  motivations for
certain fixed translations of the symbol to which they are paired and must be interpreted in their
own right. Turner thus makes a category-mistake in taking usage and exegesis as interpretations
rather than motivations for translations (ibid: 34).13
Sperber implies that the exegetical commentary of a symbol generally takes the form a
symbol is translated such-and-such because of such-and-such a motivation. For example,  the
translations of the symbolic  museng’u  tree as – depending on the context – “a multiplicity of
killings” or “a multiplicity of offspring” championed by Turner’s informants are, as described
above, motivated by physical and etymological properties.  Now, the motivation for a certain
translation is, according to Sperber, neither part of the interpretation of the symbol (as Turner has
it), nor a meta-symbolic commentary void of symbolic content: it is symbolic in its own right. 
Sperber’s  justification  for  the claim that  the  motivation  for  a  translation  of  a  certain
symbol  is  not  part  of  the  symbol’s  interpretation  is  twofold.  The  first  justification  runs  as
follows:  The  motivation  for  a  certain  translation  of  a  symbol  does  not  affect  the  semantic
properties of the translation; therefore, the motivation is redundant in the interpretation of the
12 In  light  of  the  controversy  surrounding  the  philosophical  debate  over  the  nature  of  meaning,  it  should  be
mentioned that no claim to the definition of meaning as a relation between message and interpretation is forwarded
in the subsequent sections. Talk about emically perceived meaning should, on par with Geertz, be understood as the
informant’s way of making sense out of a symbolic act (see section 3). Accordingly,  Sperber’s account is used
strictly heuristically toward the end of formulating the criterion of closure. 
13 The term  category-mistake was coined by the philosopher Gilbert Ryle in the book  The Concept of Mind to
denote the fallacy of mistakenly assuming that an entity belongs to a certain logical category when it in fact belongs
to another such category. The person strolling around the city of Lund in order to locate the University, which the
person believes to be a single building, is thus committing a category-mistake in assuming that Lund’s University
consists in a concrete building rather than an abstract organization (Ryle, 1949: 16-17).   
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symbol. Sperber asks us to consider the case of the roar. In spite of the motivation for naming the
cry emitted by a lion a “roar”, it does not alter any of the semantic properties of the word itself –
“one can understand perfectly the meaning of the word ‘roar’ while being ignorant of what a roar
sounds like”. As evidence, Sperber claims that the sentences “The lion roared” and “The lion
emitted its characteristic cry” allow the same paraphrases and can be contradicted in the same
ways – they have the same truth-value, as it were (ibid: 25). The second justification for the
claim  that  motivations  are  not  part  of  interpretations  takes,  in  turn,  the  following  form:
Motivations need be generalizable in order to be part of the symbol’s interpretation; motivations
are not generalizable; therefore, motivations are not part of the interpretation of the symbol. The
primary  justification  for  this  line  of  reasoning  states  that  the  processes  behind  establishing
meaning cannot  be completely arbitrary;  the manner  in which the interpretation decodes the
symbol need be univocal. Unfortunately, motivations are arbitrary: they are postulated ad hoc –
after the meaning already has been established. As an example, Sperber adduces the case of the
Cross being a symbol for the Christian religion  because Christ died on a cross. By the same
token, the cross could as well end up symbolizing crime, since numerous criminals have met
their  fate  in  a  similar  fashion  (ibid:  28).14 To  reiterate,  the  underlying  principles  of  such
generalizations are formulated ad hoc, after the meaning of the symbol has been established. The
limited set of symbols thus admits an unlimited set of possible interpretations.
The justification for the statement that motivations, even though they are external to the
semantic properties of the translation, are symbolic in their own right builds off of the previous
discussion in claiming that an entity becomes symbolic in virtue of the motivation applied to it.
Returning to the roar-case,  Sperber compares the sentences  “The lion roared” and “The lion
RRrroared”. The sentences have the same truth value since “RRrroared”, once interpreted as a
roar because it sounds like the lion’s cry, reads “roar” (ibid: 30). In this way, a motivation (in
this case “RRrroared”) is itself symbolic and in need of interpretation – “[f]or all keys to symbols
are part of symbolism itself.” (ibid: 50)
14 Note that the present notion of motivation concerns not only motivations for specific translations of symbols but
also ranges over motivations for a specific  ritual  use  of a symbol.  Consequently,  Turner’s  operational  meaning
suffers from the same difficulty as his exegetical meaning; “the exegetical motivation of museng’u poses the same
problem as the ritual  use of  the  museng’u:  they are both based on a principle which is not generalisable  [...]”
(Sperber: 1975: 29).
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Sperber concludes that  Turner’s ethnographical  material  amounts  to a set of clues by
means of which Ndembu experience is organized (chiljikijilu,  the Ndembu word for symbol,
corroborates this conjecture as it also means “a landmark organizing our experience of space”)
but nevertheless begs the question of the symbols’ meanings (a word lacking a proper Ndembu
counterpart) – a question which Sperber considers fallacious: talk about meaning only “prevents
us from asking, ‘If not meaning, what?’” (ibid: 33).15 If Jarvies and Firth opt for limiting the
scope of the  X-term in Geertz’s interpretation of the general formula, Sperber does the same
thing for the scope of the Y-term in Turner’s. This contention is captured in a criterion of closure
stating that a theory of symbolization need include a univocal decoding relation holding between
symbol and interpretation, closing the given set of (symbol, interpretation) pairs to the effect of
excluding  the  postulation  of  ad  hoc and  un-generalizable  relations  between  symbol  and
interpretation. In other words, the interpretation must decode the symbol through a univocal and
generalizable  principle.  Whereas  the  criterion  of  distinguishability  concerns  the  detection  of
symbolic acts and statements, the criterion of closure concerns the relation between symbol and
signification. 
***
Before  concluding,  I  would  like  to  consider  a  possible  contradiction  in  Turner’s  theory  of
symbolization that is relevant for the evaluation of his account (section 2.3). In the article “Color
Classification  in  Ndembu Ritual:  A Problem in Primitive  Classification”  from 1965,  Turner
continuously makes claims such as, “To be ‘white’ is to be in right relation to the living and the
dead” (Turner, 1967: 74) and “Whiteness expresses the generosity of the dominant partner and
[…] the gratitude of the subordinate.” (Turner: 75) without citing the ritual context in which they
occur. Examples can easily be multiplied: “Water is regarded as ‘white’ because […] washing
15 Sperber perceives of semiology as an ethnocentric ideology: the view that the others’ objects, gestures, etc. carry
interpretable  messages  is  a  mere  assumption,  a  generalization  from  the  anthropologist’s  own  culture  lacking
justification.  (Sperber,  1975:  83-4)  However,  Sperber  argues  from a  realist  point  of  view according  to  which
symbols – if they exist – need be discovered a posteriori. A more pragmatic point of view (as will be demonstrated
below) would enable talk of symbols as carrying interpretable messages given that the concept proves promotive for
the scientific aim in question. For readers interested in the realist-pragmatist discussion, Patrick Baert  (2005) is
recommended.
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symbolizes  the  removal  of  impurities”  and  “[r]ed  [...]  stands  for  killing  up  and  cutting
animals.”(ibid: 78) Now, if symbols only admit meaning in rituals, then it is quite confusing to
speak of general meanings in such a way. There is no question that Turner considers general
meanings  as  he  gives  examples  of  Ndembu  idioms  alluding  to  symbolization  outside  ritual
contexts. For instance, he writes, “I have heard an African storekeeper expostulate, when he was
accused by his employer of embezzlement, ‘My liver is white,’ much as an Englishman would
say, ‘My conscience is clear.’” (ibid: 76) Here is a case of whiteness symbolizing innocence
outside of a ritual context: symbols – contrary to Turner’s theory – seem to have meaning outside
of rituals. Indeed, were this not the case, Turner’s analysis of symbolization would be circular as
it presupposes a fixed ritual context where ritual, as noted, is defined in terms of symbols in the
first place. Consequently, if symbols are thought to gain meaning only in ritual contexts, there
would not have been any ritual context to start with.
One possible solution is that symbols are imported from a practical or everyday domain,
to a ritual context (Munn, 1973: 586). The fact that blackness symbolizes sexual passion in the
context of N’kanga, where older women, during seclusion, “take the sooty black bark of certain
trees […] and blacken the novice’s vulva”, suggests such an interpretation since women with
particularly black skin are generally desirable as mistresses (ibid: 73). Nevertheless, seeing as
colors take on wildly different significata in different rituals – as noted above, red symbolizes
both good and ill depending on the ritual – whereas the kind of general associations postulated
by Turner are univocal, this principle is not generalizable. Ergo, apart from being contradictory,
Turner’s  theory  of  symbolization  does  not  account  for  the  use  of  symbols  outside  of  ritual
contexts necessary for his theory to be non-circular.
2.3 Concluding Remarks
The  aforementioned  reproduction  of  Geertz  and  Turner’s  positions  and  their  respective
deficiencies  resulted  in  the  deduction  of  three  criteria  –  the  criterion  of  distinguishability,
evaluation,  and  closure  –  that  need  be  respected  by  any  theory  of  symbolization.  As
demonstrated in section 2.1.1, Geertz violates the criteria of distinguishability and evaluation. It
can  now  be  demonstrated  that  the  triadic  meaning  relation  between  a  symbol,  the  emic
conception  of  that  symbol  and,  lastly,  the  anthropologist’s  interpretation  of  the  former  –
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abbreviated  “{{symbol,  emic  conception},  interpretation}”  –  spawned  by  Geertz’s  double
hermeneutic,  even  if  it,  with  Sperber,  recognizes  the  necessity  of  treating  exegesis  as  itself
symbolic, does not satisfy the criterion of closure. On Geertz’s view, the gap between symbol
and interpretation requires two bridges: the first – between {symbol, emic conception} – erected
by the  informant  in  a  culturally  specific  manner  and the second – between {{symbol,  emic
conception}  interpretation}  –  hypothetically  construed by the  anthropologist  to  the  effect  of
probing the informant’s conception of his/her own culture; to deconstruct the first bridge, as it
were. According to Geertz, the type of relation holding between a certain symbol and its emic
conception  is  inferred  from the  overarching  web  of  symbolic  configurations  composing  the
culture under scrutiny. As noted in section 2.1.1, the decoding-relation Geertz’s deems operative
in the Balinese case is non-generalizable since it illegitimately excludes actions and statements
occurring  in  shallow play,  as  well  as the practice  of grooming one’s rooster.  Generally,  the
circumstances under which the rooster is deemed symbolic are unclear and postulated ad hoc. 
As Sperber notes, Turner’s account is similarly flawed as it does not satisfy the criterion
of closure: the set of interpretations paired with a given symbol is undefined and ostensibly wide
open. By the same token, Turner does not respect the criterion of distinguishability. Seeing as the
promising path of the ritual proved misleading, a proper mechanism for determining whether a
statement or action is symbolic or practical is left wanting. Lastly, it is unclear how Turner’s
theory  handles  two  contradicting  interpretations  of  a  distinct  symbolic  statement  or  action.
Suggestively, given the prominence of ritual context in Turner’s theory, a possible operation for
solving such conflicts  might  be given with reference  to  the  aim of the ritual  containing  the
symbolic statement or action.  However, such a mechanism, if general, would further confuse
Turner’s  already  rather  blurry  distinction  between  instrumental  and  dominant  symbols  (see
footnote 11). Therefore, the question whether or not Turner implicitly satisfies the criterion of
evaluation  remains  somewhat  open.  Note,  however,  that  a  theory  satisfying  the  criterion  of
evaluation is of limited use if it, like Turner’s, disrespects the criterion of distinguishability.
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3 Toward a Specific Theory of Symbolization
The  first  part  of  this  paper  demonstrates  the  difficulty  of  giving  a  general  theory  of
symbolization: the range of social phenomena that need be subsumed under the same theoretical
construct  is  plainly too vast.  One ends up with a theory so general  that  either  everything is
symbolic or a symbol arbitrarily symbolizes everything – with a disorganized taxonomy rather
than a means for understanding.  
A  possible  remedy,  nonetheless  preserving  the  spirit  of  interpretative  and  symbolic
anthropology, can be sought in the development of specific theories of symbolization(s). Instead
of treating every social  phenomenon as an instance of a universal mode of symbolization,  it
might prove fruitful to consider a plurality of symbolic logics, each aimed at understanding a
specific social phenomenon. The determiner  specific is here applied to a theory that somehow
limits the scope of either the  X-,  Y- or  C-term of the general formula in such a way that the
resulting  sets  are  subsets  of  the  wider  sets  contained  in  Geertz’s  definition  of  the  general
formula.16 Note, however, that the enterprise of defining the relation  symbolizes need not pay
similar homage to the predecessors. Thus, the analytical footwork of Geertz’s is retraced in such
a way that one trips around the problematic aspects of his theory. Moreover, following Cohen’s
tenet that classification of symbols “depends on the nature of the problem being investigated and
on the variables that are considered in the study” (1974: 25), a specific theory is explicitly aimed
at  clarifying  one  kind  of  social  phenomenon.  A  theory  along  these  lines  simplifies  the
formulation of mechanisms satisfying the distinguishability, evaluation and closure criteria. This
tendency is present in Turner’s account as he considers ritual symbols specifically; however, his
theory seemingly ranges over non-ritual  symbolization as well.  A more promising attempt is
made by Stanley J. Tambiah, whose writing – focusing on the specific problem of ritual efficacy
– to a greater extent realizes the ambition of developing a specific theory of ritual symbolization.
16 This  is   the  Norwegian  philosopher  Arne   Næss’s  characterization  of  specification,  according  to  which
formulation U is a specification of formulation T if and only if it is the case that every reasonable interpretation of U
is a reasonable interpretation of T, but not the opposite (Föllesdal et al., 2001: 285-6).  
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The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  dedicated  to  the  presentation  and  subsequent  articulation  of
Tambiah’s account to the effect of sketching one possible notion of symbolization, specifically
aimed at investigating the relation between a certain kind of power and symbolic usage in a ritual
context. Note that this attempt is mainly forwarded in order to investigate whether an alternative,
pragmatically motivated,  path is possible, and is at best a heuristic for theorizing around the
(alleged) relation in question. A first step towards this end is taken in concert with the linguistic
philosopher  J.  L.  Austin  and  anthropologist  Alfred  Gell,  whose  respective  conceptual
apparatuses clarify Tambiah’s account.
3.1 Stanley J. Tambiah: Breaking the Fourth Wall
In the introduction to his collection of articles  Culture, Thought and Action (1985), Tambiah
reveals that one of his aspirations is to unite a semantic and pragmatic analysis of ritual: a unity
between, on the one hand, Saussurean structural analysis  and, on the other hand, approaches
centered around actual symbol usage (Tambiah, 1985: 1). The first mode of analysis is directed
at the syntagmatic features of rituals whereas the second mode is aimed at understanding how
rituals can be “task-oriented and power/prestige-conferring enactments” that extend beyond the
ritual in question (ibid: 2), in other words; how the ritual scene leaks into everyday life. The
emphasis of the subsequent discussion is on this pragmatic element of Tambiah’s theory.
Departing from the idea that rituals are complexes of words (e.g., spells, prayers, songs)
and actions (e.g.,  object manipulation),  Tambiah embarks on an investigation into the factors
enabling  ritual  efficacy  (ibid:  17).  Instead  of  treating  words  and  actions  as  autonomous
structures,  their  interconnectedness  is  elucidated  for  the  purpose  of  rendering  ritual  –  and
ultimately,  emic  thought  –  rational  in  its  own right.  Even  though  Tambiah  never  explicitly
addresses symbols as such, his account of ritual acts nonetheless furnishes an implicit discussion
of the subject as ritual – in line with Geertz and Turner – is defined as “a culturally constructed
system of symbolic communication […] constituted of patterned and ordered sequences of words
and acts  [italics  added]”.  Of the  various  ways,  postulated  by Tambiah,  in  which  a  ritual  is
performative,  two  are  relevant  for  the  present  purposes:  Firstly,  a  ritual  is  performative  in
Austin’s  sense,  wherein  “saying  something  is  also  doing  something  as  a  conventional  act”.
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Secondly, a ritual involves indexical symbols, the values of which are inferred by the participants
(ibid: 128). 
3.1.1 Symbolic acts as performatives
 
The  first  concept  of  ritual  performativity  (Austin’s  variant)  is  initially  developed  as  a
contribution to the mentality debate – the debate over whether traditional or pre-scientific modes
of  thought  qualitatively  differ  from  modern  and  science-oriented  reason.  Pleading  the
universality of an analogical mode of thought and, in the same stroke, contesting the universality
of causal reasoning, Tambiah rejects such a difference. Be that as it may – it is the answer, rather
than its contribution to the mentality debate, which interests us. 
Initially, ritual acts are said to be acts “by which a property is imperatively transferred to
a recipient object or person on an analogical basis.” (Tambiah, 1985: 60) The kind of analogy
involved in rituals is labeled persuasive and primarily serves the purposes of conceptualization
and expansion of meaning.17 Tambiah gives the following pedagogical example: 
Father : Employer 
Children : Workers
In this example, “Father” and “Employer” are analogous (denoted “:”) in so far as they stand in a
similar  relation  to  their  respective  vertical  pairing  term.  By the  same token,  “Children”  and
“Workers” are analogous. Importantly, there is a divergence between the two vertical relations:
children generally love their father whilst workers usually harbor no such feelings toward their
employer  (Tambiah,  1985:  71).  Analogies,  being  both  positive  and  negative,  function  as
transferring some value from a term of the one pair to the analogous term in the other pair. In
Tambiah’s words: “two objects are seen as having resemblance and difference, and an attempt is
made to transfer the desirable quality of one to the other, which is in a defective state” (ibid: 80).
Tambiah argues that a “rite consists in persuasively transferring the properties of the desired and
desirable vertical relation to the other which is in an undesirable condition.” Such transference is
accomplished by bringing the object inhabiting the desirable position into contact with the object
17 Henceforth, persuasive analogy is simply abbreviated analogy. 
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inhabiting  the  undesirable  position.18 In  our  example,  this  would  (quite  awkwardly)  entail
bringing a child into contact with a worker in order to transfer the value of “love towards your
superior”.  Analogical reasoning and action,  then,  impose a certain desirable relation between
entities  previously  lacking  the  relation  in  question.  Furthermore,  the  alleged  effect  of  the
operation is stated verbally, in tandem with the manipulation of the objects (ibid: 72). Sticking to
our  example,  this  would  (touching  the  absurd)  mean  exclaiming  “may the  worker  love  the
employer as the child loves the father” as one brings the child in contact with the worker. Now,
instead of analyzing the relation between the verbal and nonverbal actions involved in rituals in
terms of causality (i.e. by hypothesizing that the act causes the worker to internalize the property
in  question),  Tambiah  invokes  Austin’s  speech act  theory in  arguing that  they  are  different
aspects of a performative speech act. In order to grasp this, some aspects of Austin’s theory is
reviewed.
Speech act theory aims at explaining linguistic meaning in terms of language use. In this
view, language is foremost a form of behavior or a system of action. When an utterer produces a
sentence, the meaning of the sentence is not purely – as the positivists had it – its truth conditions
(i.e. whether or not it is an adequate expression of an ostensively available fact), but rather a
complex of operations regarding its use in a certain context.19 Austin’s account involves a rich
flora of different kinds of speech acts. Every utterance is a speech act, albeit of various sorts
depending on what kind of action is being performed by it. “I apologize” and “I promise” are
thus different kinds of speech acts since they perform different actions (Austin, 1955: 151). The
kind of speech act that Tambiah alludes to is the performative, a kind of utterance which looks
like a statement and yet is neither true nor false. For instance, by declaring “I name this ship ‘the
Queen Elizabeth’”, the agent performs rather than describes the christening of the ship (ibid: 6).
The same goes for statements such as “I promise” and “I hereby pronounce you husband and
wife” – the latter uttered by a priest during a wedding ceremony. Moreover, performatives are
governed by  constitutive rules which need to be followed in order for the performative to be
successful. A set of rules is constitutive if it serves as a precondition for the practice it purports
18 Henceforth, a property sought to be transferred by exploiting some analogy in a ritual context is abbreviated
desirable property.
19 On this level of analysis, the terms  sentence and  utterance are used coextensively. Furthermore, these are not
necessarily spoken but can be communicated through text or other media of communication.
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to regulate; “[c]onstitutive rules constitute (and also regulate) an activity the existence of which
is logically dependent on the rules.”(Searle, 1969: 34). A popular example of a set of constitutive
rules is the game of chess, which is possible only in force of a set of rules defining valid moves;
“[t]he rules of football or chess, for example, do not merely regulate playing football or chess,
but  as  it  were  they  create  the  very  possibility  of  playing  such  games.”  (ibid:  33). 20 The
performative “I promise” is thus unsuccessful if the utterer does not intend to keep the promise
because such an intention is, according to Austin, part of the set of constitutive rules enabling the
act of promising in the first place. By a similar token, the utterance “I hereby pronounce you
husband and wife” is unsuccessful if the utterer is not a priest. Were this not the case, agents
would be able to arbitrarily christen and marry each other just by uttering a particular phrase.
Since Tambiah leans quite excessively on Austin’s tripartite analysis of speech acts,  a
condensed version of it is stated: Austin cuts the speech act into three acts, each performed in
concert but nonetheless analytically separable. The locutionary act is the words uttered and their
literal meaning; “[t]he act of ‘saying something’ in […] full normal sense” (Austin, 1955: 94),
for example, plainly making a meteorological prediction by stating “a storm is coming”. The
illocutionary act  is  the  performance  executed  by the  utterance,  the  forces  that  attach  to  the
locutionary act. Thus, “a storm is coming” can have the illocutionary force of a warning or a
promise,  which is  something different  from the proposition used to utter  the warning or the
promise. As noted, the illocutionary force determines what kind of speech act is performed. The
perlocutionary act, in turn, is the “consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of
the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons” (ibid: 101). For instance, the hearer might
become frightened by the warning. Importantly, illocutionary acts are conventional in the sense
that their force is predictable, whilst perlocutionary effects are nonconventional as they may take
on various forms under differing circumstances (ibid: 121-122).
Now, according to Tambiah, ritual acts – both verbal and nonverbal – are illocutionary
acts  or  performatives  “which  simply  by  virtue  of  being  enacted  (under  the  appropriate
conditions) achieve a change of state, or do something effective.” (Tambiah, 1985: 79) Thus,
20 The constitutive rule can be further clarified by comparison to the regulative rule. Regulative rules “regulate a
pre-existing activity, an activity whose existence is logically independent of the rules.” (Searle, 1969: 34). One can
think of regulative rules as imperatives such as  drive on the right side of the road. Constitutive rules are not just
normative in this sense, they are forcing. 
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rituals are effective since analogical reasoning manifests itself in some agent’s employment of
illocutionary force: by uttering the wished effect of bringing the object in a desirable position
(returning to the peculiar example: the child) in contact with the object in an undesirable position
(the worker) simultaneously as one executes the action, the value sought is actually transferred.
Similarly, the nonverbal action is also an illocutionary act or performative; “the action consists
of an operation done on an object-symbol to make an imperative and realistic transfer of its
properties to the recipient.” These verbal and nonverbal aspects, analyzed as illocutionary acts,
together constitute a ritual act (ibid: 80). 
Lastly,  Tambiah explicitly  characterizes  rituals  such as “the installation  of  a  Tallensi
chief,  Ndembu circumcision rites [and] Lodagaa  mortuary rites” as sets  of constitutive  rules
“whose  very  performance  achieves  the  realization  of  the  performative  effect”.  Such
constitutively regulated rituals may or may not imply a set of perlocutionary effects. In some
cases, the perlocutionary effects are presupposed by the illocutionary force; “when a Tallensi
chief  is  properly  installed  certain  results  must  imperatively  follow upon his  exercise  of  the
powers of office.” In other cases, no such effects are presupposed – indeed, this is the case in
every  curative  ritual  where  the  patient’s  recovery  (the  alleged  perlocutionary  effect)  is  left
wanting (ibid: 135). Moreover,  if  the ritual  is  adduced to provide “an anticipatory statement
about the success to be achieved” in the subsequent practical activity (Tambiah exemplifies with
Kula canoe-building), it is, according to Tambiah, a regulative ritual; it somehow regulates the
subsequent activity (see footnote 20 for the regulative-constitutive distinction) (ibid: 136). Thus,
on Tambiah’s account, rituals might be regulative or constitutively regulated.
3.1.2 Symbols as social agents
Speech act theory does not exhaust the ways in which a ritual is performative. Querying over the
role  of the ritual  in the maintenance  of status and power structures,  Tambiah introduces  the
notion indexical symbol. Such a symbol plays the dual role of representing the object signified
and indexing wider cosmological notions: 
[T]he concepts of indexical symbol and indexical icon are useful for showing how important parts of a
ritual enactment have a symbolic or iconic meaning associated with the cosmological plane of content,
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and at the same time how those same parts are […] indexically related to participants in the ritual,
creating, affirming, or legitimating their social positions and powers [italics added]. (Tambiah, 1985:
156)
Indexical symbols are, according to Tambiah, related to the entities indexed by a conventional
semantic rule. Accordingly, the meaning of the indexical symbol is inferred by the participants of
the ritual with reference to such semantic conventions together with “contextual features and
certain communicational understandings” (Tambiah, 1985: 156). In this view, then, an indexical
symbol – regardless of its usage – refers to some entity solely in virtue of being related to it by
some conventional sematic rule. Since Tambiah’s discussion of the indexical symbol is rather
superficial, it is useful to compensate with Gell’s fastidious take on the same topic. Gell shows
that accounts of indexicality such as Tambiah’s are fallacious for at least two reasons: they treat
symbolic communication as a semantically closed system a lá Geertz and they neglect the use
aspect of symbolic meaning.   
The first two chapters of the book Art and Agency (1998) contain the outline of Gell’s
theory  of  social  agency.21 This  theory  expands  the  kind  of  agency  traditionally  ascribed  to
humans – the ability to initiate causal sequences by intention or will alone – so that it indirectly
ranges over physical objects (Gell, 1998: 7). Gell defines  social agents as “those persons (and
things, see below) who/which are seen as  initiating causal sequences of […] events caused by
acts of mind or will  or intention [italics added].” (ibid: 16).22 Such a merging of person and
object is possible given Gell’s functional definition of agency; however, the concepts of primary
and  secondary  agents need first be clarified. The former denotes “intentional beings” such as
humans capable of initiating causal sequences by mind or will alone, whereas the latter refers to
non-intentional  beings  such  as  objects  able  to  mediate  causal  sequences  initiated  by  some
primary agent. Now, agency is a property of social contexts (rather than of isolated entities) in
which  the  secondary  agent  mediates  the  agency of  some primary  agent;  “the  [object]  is  an
21 It  should be mentioned that  Art and Agency was published posthumously and that, consequently,  the ideas it
contains might not be fully developed.   
22 A charitable interpretation of “initiating” as meaning “initiating or mediating” is done in order for Gell’s account
to be coherent. Obviously, non-intentional entities cannot initiate casual sequences by mind or will alone.
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emanation or manifestation of agency […] a mirror, vehicle, or channel of agency.” (ibid: 20) A
secondary or primary agent has agency relative to a patient: 
An agent  a  has agency only relative to a patient  p  when  p is causally affected by  a’s actions
(ibid: 22). 
Thus, which entities take the roles of agent and patient is a question of which/whom causally
affect which/whom; “in any given transaction in which agency is manifested, there is a ’patient’
who or which is  another ‘potential’  agent, capable of acting as an agent or being a locus of
agency [italics original].” (ibid: 22) As noted, at least one of the relata need be a primary agent:
If I (primary agent)  ascribe agency to my car (secondary agent)  and it  breaks down, I am a
patient since I am affected by its actions – even though they are not intended per se. Thus, the
agency of objects is by necessity indirect and contingent upon a primary agent; “objectification
in  artefact-form  is  how  social  agency  manifests  and  realizes  itself,  via  the  proliferation  of
fragments of ‘primary’ intentional agents in their ‘secondary’ artefactual forms.” (ibid: 21) 
Gell employs the notion of the indexical symbol to further elucidate the relation between
primary and secondary agent. An indexical symbol is, on Gell’s specification,  an entity from
which the observer can make abductions about the intentions or capabilities of some primary
agent – not about some cosmological notion, as Tambiah has it.23 For instance, a smile is an
index for friendliness since an observer can make the following abduction: if it is friendly, then it
smiles; it smiles; therefore, it  is friendly (ibid: 13). Even though the abduction is a logically
unsound  mode  of  inference  (a  smile  can  indicate  more  than  friendliness)  it  nonetheless
constitutes  a  way  of  hypothesizing  about  the  meanings  of  things  of  which  knowledge  is
incomplete.  In  this  view,  meaning  is  a  function  of  actions  rather  than  of  abstract  relations
between  symbol  and  signifier.  Indeed,  this  is,  according  to  Gell,  what  distinguishes  the
institution  of  language  from  social  reality;  linguistic  meaning  is  fixed  by  convention  and
tautological, thus allowing logically sound modes of inference. Were social reality essentially a
Geertzian text, one would be able to deduce intentions (e.g. friendliness) from indexes (e.g. a
smile) by necessity (ibid: 14-15). Since this is impossible, Gell can be read as a further critique
23 An abduction is a mode of inference where one concludes “A” from the premises “if A, then B” and “B” where A
and B are propositions. 
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of  Geertz’s  theory  of  symbolization  as  well  as  of  Tambiah’s  aforementioned  treatment  of
indexical symbols. 
To lead Gell  into conclusion: Objects are indexes of the agency ascribed to them by
primary agents. For example, a stone shaped as a hand axe might be an index of “its maker and
of the man who used it.” (ibid: 16) Accordingly, notions of the other, object or person, is formed
by a process of abduction from indexes. Gell’s model of indexical symbols is preferable over
Tambiah’s for at  least two reasons: First,  it  shows that a theory of symbolization,  instead of
being a theory of communication, can be a theory of action as symbols are meaningful in so far
as their manipulation alters states of affairs. Second, it circumvents the onus of explaining how
symbols can refer in the abstract, by themselves. In a wider sense, Gell’s theory echoes Turner’s
as it is forwarded as a means for understanding actual emic beliefs by focusing on culturally
specific  processes  of  abductions  –  a  feature  that  (as  will  be  demonstrated  below)  inherits
Turner’s difficulties.  
3.1.3 Summary 
On  Tambiah's  account,  ritual  acts  –  verbal  or  nonverbal  –  are  instances  of  symbolic
communication. The vehicles of such communication are, on the one hand, objects exhibiting
some  desirable  property  and,  on  the  other  hand,  symbolic  utterances  regarding  the  former.
Symbolic utterances are related to objects by articulating the analogical reasoning behind the
ritual  act  involving  the  object  in  question  (to  reiterate:  a  ritual  act  is  a  complex  of  object
manipulation and utterance). By bringing the object in contact with the recipient of the ritual,
together with verbally citing the analogical reasoning behind the act, the desirable properties are
transferred to the recipient. This, in turn, is possible since ritual acts are performative in two
different senses. Firstly, they are conceived as illocutionary acts or performatives altering states
of affairs in themselves. In this view, rituals are sets of either constitutive rules as they exist
solely in virtue of the rules regulating them, or regulative rules, as they regulate some ensuing
practical activity. Secondly, objects are indexes of agency and thus act upon the recipient (or in
Gell's  vocabulary:  the  patient)  of  the  ritual  simply  on  the  basis  of  him/her  abducting  the
intensions and capabilities of the primary agent in question. For the sake of clarity, a use-clause
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involving the  set  A of  primary agents  and a  lower-case  variable  x are  added to the  general
formula:  
A uses x to symbolize Y in C 
3.1.4 Evaluation
Tambiah’s account allows three possible interpretations of the general formula: one in terms of
speech act theory,  one in terms of indexes and a reconciliation of the two. According to the
speech act interpretation, x is an object figuring in some analogy, Y is a desirable property and C
is a certain kind of ritual.24 Agent a’s act, then, is symbolic if a exploits an analogy containing x
to the effect of transferring Y to some recipient. In other words, a enacts a speech act carrying the
illocutionary force of transferring  Y to a recipient,  who actually obtains  Y as a result  of the
operation. 
According to the interpretation in terms of indexes, a is a primary agent, x is an object, Y
is an index of  a’s intentions and  C is a certain kind of ritual. On this interpretation,  a’s act is
symbolic if the secondary agent x exercises causal powers over some patient solely in virtue of
the fact  that the patient  abducts  a’s  intensions from the object  in question together with the
analogical action. 
Interpreting the formula in light of both senses of performativity postulated by Tambiah
yields some awkward results; however, since it involves an element of abduction similar to the
aforementioned interpretation, it need not detain us. The chief reason behind this is that accounts
of symbolic meaning alluding to some patient’s abduction of some primary agent’s intentions
from an object do not satisfy the criterion of closure. Such accounts fail in the same way as
Turner’s;  abductions  are,  rather  than  decoding devices,  motivations for  fixed  interpretations,
themselves in need of interpretation. Recollect Sperber’s contentions that meaning is a relation
24 This definition appears circular since Tambiah defines  ritual in terms of symbolization in the first place (see
section  3.1).  Tambiah’s  definition  of  the  C-term  is  thus  problematic.  However,  there  are  other  defining
characteristics of rituals; for instance, it involves rules governing who is allowed to conduct them and to whom it
may be directed. Accordingly, and positively controversially, ritual could be defined as a set of enabling conditions
for successful conduction of symbolic action. This view is elaborated upon in section 3.3.  
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between  a  closed  {message,  interpretation}  pair  and  the  principle  through  which  the
interpretation decodes the symbol must be generalizable and univocal. Now, the pairs resulting
from accounts involving indexes take the shape {object, intention} and are decoded by means of
abduction. As Gell himself points out, the abductive mode of inference is logically unsound, and
thus un-generalizable: it is a function of the patient’s ad hoc reasoning connecting the object to
the intentions of some primary agent. Subsequently, the abduction is a motivation for deeming a
particular intension indexed by a particular object, itself in need of interpretation. The object
symbolizes a certain intension because of a certain arbitrary abduction process (see page 25 for
the generic structure of motivations). This begs the question of why this intension and not that
got abducted from the object (or index) in question – why did the patient abduct friendliness
from a smile rather than some other intension? The speech act interpretation, on the other hand,
implies the pair {object manipulation, speech act} where the speech act (interpretation) provides
a  generalizable  and  univocal  principle  for  decoding  the  symbol  manipulation  in  question
(message).
According to the speech act variant of Tambiah’s account, an act is symbolic if it has the
illocutionary force of transferring some desirable property of an object onto a ritual recipient by
means of exploiting some analogy. Seemingly,  the criterion of distinguishability is respected.
However,  Tambiah  writes  that  the  sought  after  transference  allegedly  effected  by  the  ritual
speech act may or may not occur: “there are constitutive acts which […] may yet be uncertain of
realizing their  expected perlocutionary effects. A classic example is curing rituals in cases of
spirit possession, which […] may or may not induce a cure in the patient.” (Tambiah, 1985: 135)
Since  the  desirable  property  may  fail  to  be  transferred,  it  follows  that  a  symbolic  act  not
necessarily needs to yield  its  purported effects  – the ritual  recipient  has been subjected to a
symbolic act even if he/she does not get cured. Hence, the mechanism for demarcating symbolic
acts from practical ones cannot make reference to a predictable illocutionary force. This being
said, Tambiah’s account still satisfies the criterion of distinguishability, albeit less forcefully than
at first sight. 
On  the  other  hand,  this  vagueness  seems  to  complicate  the  formulation  of  a  proper
mechanism for evaluating two or more contesting interpretations of a symbolic act since such a
mechanism cannot be erected with reference to the actual functions – e.g., if the ritual recipient
enjoys some new status – of the ritual speech act. Even though the alleged effect is explicitly
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stated in tandem with the non-verbal manipulation of the object with the desirable property, it is
impossible to know what the statement voicing the analogical reasoning means if the effects of
the ritual is left wanting: investigation into the actual effects of the ritual speech act is a way of
deducing the meaning  of  the analogical  reasoning.  Consequently,  the criterion  of  evaluation
seems to be disrespected.
Fortunately, this latter problem is not due to speech act theory as such, but to Tambiah’s,
somewhat  confused  interpretation  of  it.  Firstly,  throughout  his  account,  Tambiah  uses  the
expression “’illocutionary’  or ‘perforamtive’” to denote the aspect rendering rituals effective,
thus  suggesting  synonymy.  However,  the  two  concepts  belong  to  analytically  different
categories: a performative is a kind of speech act, whereas the illocutionary force is an aspect of a
speech  act.  Furthermore,  since  every  speech  act  is  a  perforamtive,  the  notion  is,  by  its
comprehensiveness,  not  very  fruitful.  Secondly,  illocutionary  force  is  confused  with
perlocutionary  effect:  the  actions  of  the  Tallensi  chief  (see  page  35)  are  not  perlocutionary
effects of the ritual speech act putting him in charge; rather, they are speech acts in their own
right. The results that “must imperatively follow [italics added]” (Tambiah, 1985: 135) from the
Tallensi installation rite are, opposite to the subsequent actions of the chief, conventional and
thus  part  of  the  illocutionary  force.  Tambiah’s  opaque  handling  of  this  distinction  makes
statements  such  as  “there  are  […]  constitutive  acts  which,  although  they  realize  their
performative dimension, may yet be uncertain of realizing their expected perlocutionary effects
[italics added]” (1985: 135) rather cryptic; the perlocutionary effects are, on Tambiah’s account,
part  of  the  performative  dimension. This  confusion  is  the  reason  why  Tambiah’s  account
disrespects the criterion of evaluation.  Thirdly,  the demarcation between a constitutive and a
regulative ritual is potentially shady.  Tambiah ascribes the property of being regulated to the
technical activity following the ritual and not to the ritual itself. The fact that a preceding ritual
regulates some posterior activity does not render the ritual itself regulative: a football game can
regulate the activity of betting without itself being less constitutively regulated. Thus, since the
argument is unsound, we have no reason to question the exclusively constitutive nature of the
rules composing rituals. 
For  these  reasons,  a  clarification  of  Tambiah’s  account  is  motivated.  This  can  be
achieved by considering the ideas developed by the philosopher John R. Searle. Such a move is
natural since Searle, as the protégé of Austin’s, developed the speech act theory substantially and
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in directions conducive for the present purposes. Importantly, Searle introduces the concept of a
declarative speech act as an explication of the perforamtive speech act. It will be demonstrated
that this notion is superior to Tambiah’s “illocutionary or perforamtive” as it provides a more
stringent model for understanding analogical reasoning. Moreover, an articulation of Tambiah’s
account in terms of Searle’s declarative speech act, apart from aiding the understanding of ritual
efficacy at large, might answer Tambiah’s question regarding the role of ritual or symbolic acts
in maintaining status and power structures in a more satisfactory way than the analysis in terms
of indexical symbols does. Truly, this is the very question posed by the prologue.             
3.2 John R. Searle: Conceptualizing Mauss’s Enigma
Searle’s overarching project is the sketching of a philosophy both for and of the nature of human
society, dealing with questions such as, “What is the mode of existence of social entities such as
governments, families,  cocktail parties […] and passports?” (Searle, 2010: 5). Coming from a
philosophical  tradition primarily focused on the logical  analysis  of natural language,  Searle's
point of departure is statements of the form “We (I) hereby declare that such-and-such is the
case”  and  their  ontological  consequences.  The  conclusion  is that  all  of  institutional  reality,
including  rituals,  is  created  and  maintained  by  one  fundamental  linguistic  mechanism:  the
declarative  speech  act.  However,  to  avoid  jumping  to  conclusions,  the  relevant  aspects  of
Searle’s philosophy are first presented.
3.2.1 Status functions and deontic power
The faculty demarcating human from non-human is according to Searle the capacity to “impose
functions on objects and people where the objects and the people cannot perform the functions
solely  in  virtue  of  their  physical  structure.”  Such  functions  are  labeled status  functions and
require collective recognition in order to be performed. The full definition of a status function
is:  
 
[A] function that is performed by an object(s), person(s), or other sort of entity(ies) and which can
only be performed in virtue of the fact that the community in which the function is performed assigns
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a certain status to the object, person or entity in question, and the function is performed in virtue of the
collective […] recognition of the object, person, or entity as having that status. (Searle, 2010: 94) 
 
The paradigm example of a status function is the value of a twenty dollar bill.  This value is not
deducible from sheer physical properties; instead, it is a product of collective intentionality or
intersubjectivity  (Searle,  2010:  7).  A  more  anthropologically  minded  example  of  a  status
function is the function of a Maussian gift imposed on some initially neutral object – there is
nothing about the plainly physical properties of an object that grants it the status of a gift. 
Status  functions  carry deontic  powers,  a  rather  vague concept  ranging over  relational
entities such as rights, duties, obligations, permissions and so on. For example, Barack Obama
has a certain set of duties in virtue of his status as president. In virtue of their relation to deontic
powers, status functions creates desire-independent  reasons for action, defined by Searle as a
vague  set  of  reasons  such  as  obligations,  duties  and  rights  untraceable  to  some  desire  or
inclination of the agent; “to recognize something as a right, duty, obligation, requirement and so
on is to recognize a reason for action.” (Searle, 2006a:  19). As demonstrated in the prologue,
whereas  fear  is  a  desire-dependent  reason  for  reciprocating  a  gift  in  Northwest  American
potlatch,  the status function of the Polynesian gift provides a desire-independent reason – an
obligation – to reciprocate.  Note that one can have desire independent  and desire dependent
reasons  for  action  simultaneously.  Undoubtedly,  this  is  the  case  in Polynesian gift  exchange
where receiving a gift might motivate a desire-dependent reason for reciprocating, namely the
desire to maintain alliances. Nonetheless, even if one has such a desire-dependent reason, the
obligation to reciprocate is itself  a reason independent from that desire. Interestingly enough, in
the Polynesian case, the desire to maintain alliances resembles a perlocutionary effect of giving.
3.2.2 Declarative speech acts
To unpack the notion of the declarative speech act, Searle introduces the concept of direction of
fit.  The  direction  of  fit  is  the  mode  in  which  the  speech act  relates  to  reality.  Speech  acts
purporting to represent a particular state of affairs, for instance “The cat is on the mat”, have a
downward direction of fit since their truth is a function of the degree to which they actually
represent the state of affairs in question – the fact that there is a cat on the mat. Searle confesses
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that he thinks “of these speech acts as hovering over the world and pointing down at it, as fitting
or failing to fit the world, as having […] the word-to-world direction of fit [i.e. a downward
direction of fit].” (2010: 11) Conversely, some speech acts have the upward direction of fit, or
the  world-to-word  direction  of  fit.  These  are  performatives  such  as  ordering and
promising whose point “is to get the world to change to match the content of the speech act.” For
example, when an agent utters “I promise to give you the book tomorrow”, the speech act aims at
causing fulfillment rather than adequately representing a state of affairs.  
Now, declarations are speech acts enjoying both directions of fit simultaneously, ”[t]hey
change the world by declaring that a state of affairs exists and thus bringing that state of affairs
into existence.” These are speech acts achieving upward direction of fit by altering reality to
match their content, but do so in virtue of representing reality as being so changed, and in the
same  stroke  achieving  the  downward  direction  of  fit.  For  instance,  by  uttering  “I  hereby
pronounce you husband and wife” the priest alters reality so that it comply with the content of
his speech act (upward direction of fit), but this is possible only in virtue of him representing
reality thus altered (downward direction of fit) – the priest imposes a status function by explicitly
saying that it is the case (Searle, 2010: 12). Likewise, the donor’s act of giving a gift alters some
state of affairs by imposing a power relation between him/herself and the receiver just by – in the
act of giving – representing the state of affairs that one is donor and one is receiver. This analysis
is a essentially a paraphrase of Nancy Munn’s contention that symbolic transaction conducted
during rituals carries a social message in enforcing relationships between agents; “we might say
that this social message is co-implied by the symbol vehicles, since in any particular instance the
relevant  relationship  is  demonstrated  by the  transaction  itself [italics  added].”  (Munn,  1973:
581). Furthermore, a set of constitutive rules need be satisfied in order for the gift exchange to
count as such. Returning to Polynesian gift exchange, the object exchanged must be taonga. The
set of declarative speech acts is, then, a subset of the wider set of Austin's performative speech
acts outlined above: all declaratives are performatives but not all performatives are declaratives.
For instance, the act of promising is a performative but because it lacks a downward direction of
fit, it is not a declarative. Consequently, the declarative is a specification of the performative.
The notions of status function and deontic power can now quasi-formally be related to
that of the declarative speech act:
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We (or I) make it the case by declaration that a Y status function exists in C and in so doing we (or I)
create a relation R between Y and a certain person or persons, S, such that in virtue of [Y being related
to S], S has the power to perform acts (of type) A (Searle, 2010: 101-2).
Since we never quite left Polynesia: Let  Y be a gift, let  S denote the set of donors and let  A
denote the kind of act imposing obligations; then, the formula reads, “We (or I) make it the case
by declaration that the status function of a gift exists in Polynesian gift exchange and in so doing
we (or I) create a relation between the gift and a specific donor such that in virtue of this donor’s
relation to the status of the gift, this donor has the power to impose obligations.” (Searle, 2010:
101-2) The collective recognition ranges over both ascription of status functions and the implied
deontic  power  relations  subjecting  people  to  desire  independent  reasons  for  action.  Hence,
deontic power relations between agents might be legitimized a fortiori by the continued use of
the vocabulary corresponding to the institution generating them. By this device, deontic power
relations  are  inherent  in  some vocabularies;  ordinary talk  of  gifts  legitimizes  deontic  power
relations between agents related to that very status function (ibid: 104).
3.2.3 Standing declarations
Having defined the declarative, Searle relates it to the constitutive rule by claiming that such
rules are instances of a kind of latent speech act labeled a standing declaration. This declaration
is  standing because it is a conditional claiming that “if there is an x that satisfies  P, then that  x
counts as Y”. Expressed differently: the standing declaration “makes it the case into the indefinite
future” that every x satisfying P counts as Y where x denotes a physical or neutral entity (e.g. a
shell),  Y refers to a status function (e.g. the status of gift) and  P denotes a set of properties
necessary for  x in order to enjoy Y (e.g. that the thing satisfying  x is taonga) (ibid: 97). Since
recognition is implicit in the acceptance of constitutive rules or standing declarations, separate
acts of recognition are superfluous (Searle, 2010: 13).25 Thus, one need not explicitly accept the
rules of Polynesian gift exchange to render them operative. The relation between the singular
declaration and the standing declaration, then, is such that the former imposes status functions
25 The term acceptance does not involve approval; rather, “[a]cceptance [...] can range all the way from enthusiastic
endorsement to grudging acquiescence.” (Searle, 2010: 103-4)
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whilst  the latter  presents the conditions  for such imposing;  the standing declaration  need be
collectively recognized in order for status functions to be imposed. For instance, in Polynesian
gift exchange there are standing declarations stating the conditions under which two persons are
engaged in gift exchange involving that the thing exchanged must be taonga and the exchange
itself need be between such-and-such agents. Once the institution – e.g. of gift exchange – is
created, the institutional facts it generates – e.g. new power relations – need not be recognized in
any specific attitude since such facts are recognized a fortiori by the collective recognition of the
institution itself. In other words: the institution  ”consists of sets of standing Declarations, and
satisfying the conditions set down by these Declarations counts as constituting the institutional
facts  in  question.” (ibid:  102). Truly,  institutions  need  not  be  maintained  through  continual
utterances of explicit declarative speech acts of the type “I hereby declare this such-and-such”, as
noted,  the  maintenance  of  an  institution  is  foremost  marked  by  the  continued  use  of  the
vocabulary and practice corresponding to that institution (ibid: 103). Along these lines, implicit
declarative speech acts permeate all talk about gift exchange, husbands, wives, private property
and money, reinforcing the corresponding institutions. 
Before viewing Tambiah’s account of ritual efficacy against the background of Searle’s
framework, Amie L. Thomasson’s twofold critique of Searle’s standing declaration is briefly
reproduced and commented upon. Firstly, according to Thomasson, the extension of the X- or x-
term is ambiguous: it can either be a set of things or a specific member of that set – all physical
objects  of  a  certain  kind  or  some particular  physical  object  of  that  kind.  Even  though  the
member-interpretation  implies  that  if  a  specific  twenty-dollar  bill  gets  lost  during  print,  it
remains  a  simple  piece  of  paper  since  no  status  function  is  ever  imposed  on  it  by  some
intentional  beings,  this  is  the interpretation accepted in the current paper (Thomasson,  2003:
274). Interpreting the x-term as ranging over a specific object yields no such absurdities on the
account  forwarded in the subsequent  chapters  since the ascription  of a status  function  to  an
object satisfying the x-term need, in opposition to Searle, be explicit. The second problem with
the Searlian standing declaration is that the status functions are assumed to be imposed on actual
physical objects. Thomasson argues that this is not valid across the field. For instance, the status
function of being a company is not imposed on some concrete object; rather, it is imposed on an
entity in itself abstract (ibid: 273). Now, this fact does not concern us since the range of the x-
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term is,  on the account developed below, limited to only a physical  object  figuring in some
analogy. 
3.3 Tambiah Revisited: P-symbolization 
Filtering Tambiah’s account through Searle’s conceptual apparatus amounts to a clarification of
ritual  efficacy.  Rituals  are  performative  since  the  ritual  acts  –  verbal  and  nonverbal  –  are
declarative in the aforementioned sense. This entails that the manipulation of objects enjoying
some  desirable  property,  together  with  the  accompanying  utterances  stating  the  analogical
reasoning, imposes status functions upon the recipient of the ritual act. Transferring a desirable
property  is,  then,  a  matter  of  imposing  a  status  function  through  something  which  can  be
stipulated as a declarative ritual act. This term denotes acts combining the verbal and nonverbal
declarative  acts  involved in the transferences  described above. Moreover,  the status function
carries  a  set  of  deontic  powers.  The  relation  between  symbolic  acts  and  the  creation  and
maintenance  of  deontic  power  structures  is  now spelled  out:  singular  declarative  ritual  acts
enforce deontic power relations whereas standing declarations enable and, indirectly through the
vocabulary corresponding to the institution, maintain such relations. In this view, a ritual is a set
of  constitutive  rules  or standing declarations  – an institution,  as it  were – enabling singular
declarative ritual acts. Subsequently, a declarative ritual act fails if the sought social relationship
is  not  imposed.  This  variant  of  ritual  failure  is  also  recognized  by Munn,  who  writes  that
“[r]ituals ‘fail’ when they no longer […] serve the participants as a means of transacting their
relationships in social terms that contain ‘intimations’ of personal identity” (1973, 582). Thus,
the circularity – defining ritual in terms of symbolization and symbolization in terms of ritual –
exhibited  in  both  Turner  (see  section  2.2.1)  and  Tambiah’s  (see  footnote  24)  accounts  is
circumvented by defining ritual as a set of enabling conditions for successful symbolization.   
As hinted  upon in the preceding  section,  it  is  necessary to  slightly diverge  from the
Searlian  standing  declaration.  Apart  from  being  the  enabling  conditions,  the  standing
declarations composing a ritual containing declarative ritual acts need involve explicit imposition
of  status  functions;  after  all,  it  is  the  declarative  ritual  act  that  renders  rituals  effective.
Consequently, at least some standing declaration operative in rituals will have to be formulated
in the following vein: “if  x figures in some analogy and is subjected to a ritual declarative act,
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then that object is a means for transferring its properties to some recipient”. The important point
is that, contrary to the value of a twenty-dollar bill, the status functions involved in declarative
ritual  acts  need be explicitly  and separately imposed.  On the other  side,  the set  of  standing
declarations indirectly enabling the declarative ritual act – e.g., those stating who has the right to
enact declarative ritual acts etc. – need not be explicitly enacted. This amounts to a specification
of Tambiah’s account,  aimed at understanding the relation between symbolic acts and power
structures. As a result, some social phenomena deemed ritualistic by Tambiah are excluded; for
instance, curative rites whose curative effects are uncertain. 
We  are  now  in  a  position  to  formulate  a  working  definition  D1 of  the  notion  of
symbolization related to that of deontic power, thus answering the questions initially posed by
the prologue:26
D1 A uses x to p-symbolize Y in C if and only if: (1) x is a neutral object figuring in some
analogy, (2) Y is a desirable property, (3) C is a ritual and (4) A’s manipulation of x is a
declarative ritual act.    
Where the  A-term denotes the set of agents justified in conducting the declarative ritual act in
question. This entails that a’s manipulation of some object x is a declarative ritual act exploiting
some analogy in transferring a desirable property onto a recipient. In this view, the transferring
of Y onto some recipient is specified as a status function imposition. Thus, the imposition of a
desirable property on a recipient creates desire independent reasons for actions in the recipient in
question: the recipient has some obligation, right, etc. which he/she did not have prior to the
ritual act.  Now, this reasoning is not alien to anthropologists. For example,  Munn holds that
“[r]itual symbols are testaments to the joining of individuals in objective relationships that have
personal subjective relevance and internalized normative value” (1973: 582). Moreover, in line
with D1, Cohen captures the symbolic aspect of power imposition; “[t]he ceremonials employed
in [installation rites] are necessary not only to impress the audiences of ordinary people with the
26 To  distinguish  this  notion  from other  kinds  of  symbolizations,  expressions  such  as  “p-symbolization”,  “p-
symbol”  and  “p-symbolic”  are  used.  Introducing  different  notions  of  symbolization(s)  enables  more  precise
analyses. Even though the question pertaining to the philosophical merits of such a move is slightly outside the
scope of this paper, section 2 grants some prima facie justification for a plurality of notions of symbolization(s).     
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transformed nature of the incumbents of the positions of authority, but also to […] reassure the
incumbents  themselves  of  the  reality  of  that  transformation  [italics  added]”  (1974:  78).
Considered  together,  conditions  (1)  –  (4)  are  one  of  the  standing  declarations  enabling  the
subsequent enactments of singular ritual declarative acts.27 The divergence from Searle’s general
account previously discussed is captured in condition (4), stating the necessity of an explicit
declarative ritual act. On the other hand, auxiliary standing declarations need not be explicitly
recognized by repetitively uttering the same singular  declarative  speech act;  rather,  they are
accepted by the ensuing use of the corresponding vocabulary. In Cohen’s words, “The functions
of symbolic behavior are almost by definition  unintended by the actors. When men in African
Muslim polity gather in a congregation to pray on Friday, they do not say: Let us pray in order to
consolidate the weakening position of the chief [...]” (1974: 53).28
3.3.1 Evaluation
27 Seeing as the standing declaration is an abstraction from singular declarative speech acts, the former is obviously
logically prior to the latter. However, since Searle also holds that standing declarations are the enabling conditions
for singular declaratives, the relationship between the two seems to be complex. Unfortunately, inquiries regarding
their  exact  relation are  outside the  scope of  the  current  discussion  as  they border  the  topic  of  social  genesis.
Therefore,  the interested reader is  referred to chapter  four in Searle  (2010) where the evolution of language is
treated.    
28 Note that D1 is exclusively a means for labeling a specific set of social phenomena in such a way that their 
emically perceived interconnectedness is made lucid. Consequently, the ontological commitments resulting from the
employment of D1 must not exceed those made by the informants whose behavior it ranges over. One way of 
safeguarding against illegitimate ontological commitments is to demand of the sentence making ontological claims 
that it, in principle, has a meaningful emic correlate or paraphrase. Accordingly, expressions such as “obligation”, 
“duty” and “right”, implied by “status function” must in principle yield a meaningful paraphrase upon interpretation,
ranging over the same set of social phenomena. Contrary to postulating Western notions inept (vide Martin Holbraad
(2012)), D1 is a heuristic for subsuming alleged regularities within human behavior under a univocal perspective. 
Indeed, the limit of anthropological representation is a controversial topic. For instance, surveying the current state 
of anthropological perspectives on knowledge, Malcolm R. Crick, presents the questions, "[c]an anthropological 
interpretation be valid if they imply meanings that actors do not know? What do anthropologists have to do to justify
the interpretative framework they use?" as rather open (1982: 299).
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D1 satisfies the criterion of distinguishability as an act has a p-symbolic dimension only if it has
the illocutionary force of imposing a status function furnishing desire independent reasons for
actions  upon some agent.  Granted,  similar  desire  independent  reasons for action stems from
practical  acts  as  well;  nevertheless,  the  feature  demarcating  p-symbolic  acts  from  merely
practical ones is that the former involve analogical reasoning within a ritual context.  Failing to
exhibit some of these characteristics does not necessarily render the act practical; however, there
is no reason to deem it an instance of p-symbolization. Methodologically, in the spirit of Mauss,
one starts by observing the empirically salient consequences of deontic power relations: Who has
obligations towards whom? Who has the right to do such-and-such? Why does he/she have that
right? Answering such queries is equal to hypothesizing around the various possible standing
declarations  composing  the  ritual  in  question.  Indeed,  Searle  advices  us  to  ask,  “[d]oes  its
existence  imply  deontic  powers  […]?”  in  order  to  isolate  declarative  acts  (2010:  91).
Importantly,  illocutionary  force  is  governed  by  convention  and  therefore  subjected  to
regularities. Possible desire dependent reasons for action spawned by the declarative ritual act
are, on the other hand, nonconventional and more alike to perlocutionary effects. Subsequently,
if we assume p-symbolization as an analytic framework, our attention is directed at recurrent and
empirically conspicuous phenomena such as object manipulation and the deontic power relations
born in its wake; it is simply a heuristic for analyzing power ascription within ritual structures.     
The criterion of closure is, in turn, respected since  D1 constitutes a generalizable and
univocal principle – the declarative ritual act – for decoding the meaning of p-symbolic acts. In
this  view, the code (the bearer of meaning according to Sperber) consists in a closed set of
{object manipulation, declarative ritual act} pairs where the ritual declarative act (interpretation),
which is a sound decoding device, decodes the object manipulation in question (message).
Lastly, with regards to the criterion of evaluation, it is hard to conceive of a situation
wherein we have two or more contradicting interpretations of an instance of p-symbolization. In
the  end,  to  say  that  an  instance  of  p-symbolization  is  arbitrary  is  to  say  that  one  cannot
discriminate between which of two or more possible status functions that is imposed through the
declarative ritual act. Given that the kind of transformation achieved by the declarative ritual act
– its  illocutionary force – is  explicitly  stated upon enactment,  and that  the  ritual  recipient’s
changed status has empirically salient consequences, the criterion of evaluation is satisfied  a
fortiori by the mechanism satisfying the criterion of distinguishability.
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3.3.2 An application
Much of Holbraad’s book  Truth in Motion: The Recursive Anthropology of Cuban Divination
(2012) is dedicated to understanding the notion of truth employed by the professional diviners
(babalawos) of the Ifá cult in Cuba. As practicing diviners, babalawos use oracles to, as they say
“get to the truth of things” regarding their  consultants’ and their  own lives (Holbraad, 2012:
xvii). Contrary to the received view of truth-claims as simply depicting the world, the oracular
truth-claims, or verdicts, are considered to actually transform the world. Consequently, they are
conceived of as indubitably true (ibid: 55). Remarkably enough, these verdicts “entail forms of
obligation that compel particular actions” (ibid: xix). Such authority is granted the babalawos in
virtue of their ability to channel the will of Orula, “the wise deity of Ifá divination.” (ibid: 5).
According  to  Hoolbrad,  making  sense  of  oracular  truth-claims  requires  challenging  the
consensus that “anthropology’s attempt to make sense of other people must [...] take the form of
providing appropriate representations […]” (ibid: xv). The alleged fallacy, then, is the doctrine of
truth as representation,  according to which a statement is true only if it  adequately depicts a
specific state of affairs;  “[w]hatever it  may be that [the others] say or do, let  alone think or
believe, we are not equipped to represent it [italics added].” (ibid: 246-7) Furthermore, this has,
according to Holbraad, led to confused ethnography:
Diviners’ claim […] is not just to truth, but rather to a kind of truth that has also been something of a
holy  grail  in  the  Western  tradition  of  reasoning,  namely  indubitable  truth.  Having  missed  this
distinction, anthropologists have effectively assumed that divinatory verdicts could only issue truths
that are inherently open to doubt. This misinterprets the ethnography of divination and thereby also
prejudices its analysis. (ibid: 55)
Now, in  light  of  the  preceding chapters  it  is  arguable  that  Holbraad’s  “anthropologists”  are
straw-men. As noted in section 3.1.1, Tambiah, rather than forcing the notion of representational
truth upon his informants, analyzes ritual acts in terms of efficacy and ineptness.  Even though
Holbraad  dedicates  a  couple  of  paragraphs  to  explaining  how  his  account  differs  from
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Tambiah’s, no clear distinction is arrived at.29 Accordingly, Hoolbrad’s data should not strike us
as quite so inexplicable as he makes it out to be; rather, they invite an opportunity to showcase a
possible  application  of  p-symbolization.  Towards  this  end,  some  ethnographic  excerpts  of
Holbraad’s  revolving  around  oracular  utterances  and  the  notion  of  aché are  cited.  As  a
consequence,  Hoolbrad’s  dichotomy  between  the  anthropologist’s  notion  of  truth  and  emic
notions of truth is challenged: one might not need to abandon truth as representation in order to
make sense of alterity. This latter point is demonstrated by applying D1 to the case of aché.
All Ifá divination involves aché, “[a] peculiar concept-cum-substance” primarily used for
rendering items employed in divination effective (ibid: 156). Aché has two senses: it refers both
to concrete powder and to the concept of power. Holbraad sets out to formulate the “clear logical
connection”  between  these  two  conceptions  of  aché,  as  such  a  connection  is  assumed  by
babalawos. The connection is summarized informally as follows:
On the one hand, to have the power of aché as  a diviner one must be properly consecrated  as a
babalawo  and  this  […]  involves  receiving  and  knowing  how to  use  the  consecrated  equipment,
29 The paragraph in question reads: 
Tambiah’s turn to performativity is proposed explicitly as a turn away from questions about the truth-
value of ritual utterances, inasmuch as they adopt the philosophical assumption that truth must be, to
recall Austin’s famous distinction, a matter of word’s capacity to say things rather than do them […]
by contrast, my interest is in developing an analysis of divinatory speech acts that places their claim
to truth at the core of their performative character.  Cutting across the Austinian axiom of saying
versus doing, my question is about how divinatory utterances are able to do truth […] [italics added]
(Holbradd, 2012: 58)
First off, the truth values of the locutionary act notwithstanding, Austin does not analyze performatives taken as
wholes  (i.e.  sums  of  locutionary,  illocutionary  and  perlocutionary  acts)  in  terms  of  their  truth  value;  instead,
perforamtives are happy or unhappy (Austin, 1955: 45, 133). Secondly, there is no reference to where Austin erects
the alleged axiom of saying  versus doing. Rather, perforamtives involve saying  and doing as the locutionary and
illocutionary aspects are inseparable (ibid: 133). Lastly, the italicized statement is quite opaque: what does it mean
to place truth at the heart of a performative character? How does this differ from regarding transformation of a state
of  affairs  as  an  illocutionary  force?  Tambiah  explicitly  favors  the  illocutionary  aspects  and  downplays  the
locutionary act and its epistemological baggage.
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charged with the powder of aché.  No powder no power, so to speak. On the other hand, the secret
knowledge required to prepare aché powders and use them for Ifá is possessed only by babalawos […]
Thus, preparing and using these powders is within the power of babalawos exclusively – so, no power
no powder also [italics added]. (ibid: 157)
After dismissing analyses made in terms of causality and logical necessity, Holbraad goes on to
adduce his own, rather esoteric, account. Unfortunately, this exposé of Ifá ontology is outside the
scope of the current paper. Be that as it may,  for the present purposes it suffices to consider
Holbraad’s aforementioned summary of the connection between the two significations of aché.
Seemingly, Holbraad confuses two different kinds of powers implicit in the notion of aché: on
the one hand, the consecrating power of powder and, on the other hand, the power enjoyed by
babalawos using the powder to consecrate with. Indeed, Holbraad himself writes of aché as an
”enabling  condition  or power  [italics  added].”  (ibid:  154)  Moreover,  the  statement  that
“[d]ivining powder […] is considered magically potent in its own right” (ibid: 132) suggests that
there is no use aspect involved in the power of the powder, an aspect integral in the power of the
babalawo. Toward the end of demonstrating the applicability of D1, let the consecrating power
enjoyed by powder be denoted  power1 and the power enjoyed by babalawos to use powder to
consecrate with be denoted power2 and consider the following statement: 
“A babalawo uses powder to p-symbolize power1”
Upon interpreting this in light of D1, the relation between the two senses of aché – on the one
hand powder and, on the other hand, power – is clarified. Firstly, powder is an object figuring in
some analogy. Secondly, power1 is a desirable property sought to be transferred to a neophyte.
Thirdly,  the  employment  of  powder  by  a  babalawo to  initiate  a  neophyte  imposes  a  status
function – that of a  babalawo – onto the neophyte. In turn, this status function carries deontic
powers such as the right to use powder to consecrate. But this is power2, so power2 is a deontic
power  imposed  on  the  neophyte  upon  initiation  by  a  declarative  ritual  act  exploiting  some
analogy. The analogy in question can be mapped as:
Power1 : Power2
Powder : Neophyte
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The property of power1 – the ability to consecrate items – is transferred to the neophyte upon
initiation by the a declarative ritual act in which the babalawo ceremonially marks the body of
the neophyte with powder, thus putting him in the same favorable relation to power2 as powder
has  to  power1 and,  consequently,  rendering  the  neophyte  powerful;  “[j]ust  as  the  powder
babalawos use on their divining board is powerful […] consecrated objects and the initiates’
marked bodies are powerful (‘have aché’)” (ibid: 168). The bracketed expression concluding the
preceding quote refers to power2, the power enjoyed by babalawos to use consecrated items and,
ultimately, consecrate other neophytes.30 In short: power1 is a desirable property and power2 is a
deontic power carried by the status function of  babalawo. Moreover, the standing declaration
corresponding to power1 reads: ”if a powder is manipulated by a babalawo, then it has power1
and can be used to consecrate neophytes during initiation”, whereas the one concerning power2
yields: “if a neophyte is initiated by a babalawo, then he has power2 – the right to use powder to
consecrate  in  divination.”  Note  that  both  these  standing  declarations  involve  the  respective
explicit declarative ritual acts of manipulation and initiation. Standing declarations enabling the
aforementioned  declarative  ritual  act,  on  the  other  hand,  do  not  necessarily  contain  explicit
declarative  ritual  acts.  For  instance,  there  is  a  rule  stating  that  only  heterosexual  males  are
allowed to enter into to the Ifá cult (ibid: 93).   
According to  D1, the declarative ritual act involves a verbal act stating the analogical
reasoning behind the operation. However, since Holbraad does not discuss the relation between
the verbal and nonverbal ritual acts in sufficient detail, such an analysis is difficult to conduct.
The most potent evidence of analogical reasoning is found in the description of the preparatory
stages of divination, where the babalawo first tastes the powder with his tongue and then uses it
to mark his forehead. This procedure is accompanied by the rest of the attending  babalawos’
30 Examples of the many desire independent reasons for action created by the status function of  babalawo can
easily be multiplied: “the crucial leap from just being able to participate in rituals to gaining the right to dispense
them oneself  is  only achieved  by those practitioners  who ‘make themselves  Ifá’  by undergoing  the  weeklong
initiation ceremony [italics added]”, “Only babalawos are entitled to disperse Ifá rituals [italics added].” (Holbraad,
2012: 90) and only initiated have “the  right to wear consecrated insignia, such as bracelets (iddé) and necklaces
(collares), which are deemed to contain divine power in their own right [italics added].” (ibid: 124) In line with the
methodological commitment made in footnote 28, these notes indicate that the informants in question recognize
concepts such as obligations, duties and rights. 
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exclamation,  “Niwawaché!”,  translating  “the  power  has  arrived!”  (ibid:  156).  One  possible
interpretation of this situation is that the verbalized speech act renders the marked  babalawo
powerful (in the sense of power2). Among Holbraad’s general notes on the verbalized ritual acts
involving aché one finds multiple examples of similar evocation of power. For instance; “[t]he
importance  of  aché  as  […]  power  is  enshrined  in  the  liturgy  of  the  divinatory  ritual,  with
babalawos  invoking it by name as part of the various incantations that have to be chanted to
achieve a successful divination [italics added]” (ibid: 154) and the expression “Addaché!” which,
according to Holbraad, is a verbal evocation of the power of aché uttered by the babalawos (ibid:
155). Rather than providing conclusive evidence for the interpretation of  aché advanced at the
moment, such ethnographical notes may point in a favorable direction.  
It  has been argued that the relationship  between  aché as  powder and  aché as  power can be
elucidated  through  the  notion  of  p-symbolization:  The  desirable  property  of  power1 is  p-
symbolically transferred to the neophyte, thus granting him the status function of babalawo and
power2. This is achieved by bringing the aché powder in contact with the neophyte’s body during
initiation. This analysis (if valid) appears to entail that the dichotomy postulated by Holbraad
between  truth  as  representation  and  emic  conceptions  of  truth  is  a  false  one.  Truth  as
representation and emic notions of truth belongs to different levels of analysis: there is nothing
contradictory about representing emic notions of truth – even if the latter does not itself involve
representational  aspects.  Since  an  independent  argument  showing  the  illegitimacy  of
representation – even if the notions involved in the anthropologist’s representation do not carry
ontological  baggage  exceeding  that  of  the  informants  (see  footnote  28)  –  is  left  wanting,
Holbraad’s  antirepresentationalism  seems  somewhat  premature.  Note  that  this  last  point  is
somewhat  secondary and in dire need of further  justification.  The purpose of this  section is
chiefly demonstrational: the application under current scrutiny is produced for the purpose of
demonstrating the possibility of subsuming oracular ritual acts (truth-claims proper as well as
nonverbal acts) under the notion of p-symbolization. This being said, it goes without saying that
it is a vastly underinformed interpretation of Holbraad’s ethnographical data. At best, it gives a
prima facie justification for the merits of D1.
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4 Conclusion
The discussion is now led into conclusion by a terse reproduction of the overall argument. Thus,
the connection between the various lines of reasoning developed during the course of the paper
will be made reviewable.     
In section 2,  it  was demonstrated that Geertz and Turner respectively attribute  to the
notion of  symbolization the logical structure “X symbolizes  Y in  C” – which we labeled “the
general formula” – where X denotes the set of symbols,  Y refers to the set of significata and C
ranges over the kind of social context. It was noted that Geertz and Turner drew on different
aspects of the general formula: Geertz’s chiefly focused on the extension of the X-term and the
nature of the symbol. Fundamentally, Geertz regards the symbol as the primary means for human
cognition  and reduces  the  entirety  of  social  reality  to  symbolic  behavior.  Famously,  Geertz
presents the Balinese cockfight as a symbolic nexus through which the participants contemplate
the entire  social  system.  Turner,  on the other  hand, is  concerned with symbols  employed  in
ritual. However, by conducting a tripartite analysis of symbolic meaning, Turner places great
emphasis on the relation symbolize and the scope of the Y-term. For instance, the Ndembu milk
tree is claimed to symbolize everything from breasts to the continuity of Ndembu society. On
Turner’s view, the signification of a certain symbol is reached by means of monitoring emic
exegesis, particularly how the symbol is used in ritual and what the informants say of it. 
The  respective  reproductions  of  Geertz  and  Turner’s  theories  were  succeeded  by  a
demonstration of their shortcomings. In Geertz’s case, this was accomplished through Jarvie’s
critique, according to which the attribution of a symbolic dimensions to behavior and statements
tends to be done arbitrarily. The problematic parts of Turner’s theory were isolated by observing
Sperber’s critique.  Essentially,  Sperber argues that the relation postulated by Turner between
symbol and interpretation really is a relation between symbol and  motivation for a translation.
Further,  apart  from  being  ad  hoc and  non-generalizable,  such  motivations  are  themselves
symbolic and objects for interpretation in their own right.
From these critiques,  three criteria  that  need be considered by an adequate theory of
symbolization were deduced: (1) The criterion of distinguishability, according to which a theory
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of symbolization need include at least one un-arbitrary mechanism for determining whether a
statement or act is symbolic or practical, (2) the criterion of evaluation, stating that a theory of
symbolization need involve at least one mechanism for evaluating contesting interpretations of
symbolic statements or acts and, lastly, (3) the criterion of closure, according to which a theory
of  symbolization  need  include  a  univocal  decoding  relation  holding  between  symbol  and
interpretation, closing the given set of {symbol, interpretation} pairs to the effect of excluding
the  postulation  of  ad hoc and  un-generalizable  relations  between  symbol  and  interpretation.
Whereas  the  criterion  of  distinguishability  concerns  the  detection  of  symbolic  acts  and
statements, the criterion of closure concerns the relation between symbol and interpretation – the
meaning-relation, in Sperber’s terms.
Seeing as Geertz and Turner’s respective theories were quite all-embracing,  section 3
argued that  specificity might  be a feature conducive for satisfying the three criteria.  For the
purpose  of  demonstration,  Tambiah’s  theory  of  ritual  efficacy  was  presented.  Ultimately,
Tambiah’s theory explains ritual efficacy in terms of analogical reasoning and performativity:
verbal and non-verbal ritual acts are Austinian speech acts exploiting some analogy and, in the
same  stroke,  transforming  some  state  of  affairs  simply  by  being  enacted.  Correspondingly,
another clause – “A uses” – was added to the general formula which then read “A uses  x to
symbolize  Y in  C”.  Apart  from  delimiting  the  scope  of  the  notion  of  symbolization  to  a
substantially higher degree than Geertz and Turner managed, Tambiah directs his account at a
specific social phenomenon (i.e. ritual efficacy). This twofold specificity proved paramount for
satisfying the three criteria and was therefore elaborated upon in the subsequent sections.  
The elaboration reached its acme in section 3.3, where a specified version of Tambiah’s
model was stated to the effect of clarifying the relation between the notion of symbolization and
that of deontic power. Leaning on Searle’s conceptual apparatus – predominantly the notion of a
declarative speech act – the refined analysis replaced the vagueness inherent in its predecessor
with a narrower scope. For instance, curative rituals were excluded. Consecutively, the merits of
this  version  –  labeled  p-symbolization  –  were  demonstrated  by  considering  Holbraad’s
ethnographic puzzle of aché. 
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In the end, the current paper hopefully provides a new perspective on what Cohen holds
to be the central theoretical problem in social anthropology: the relationship between symbolic
action and power.
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